Ideological representation and competitive congressional elections

Competitive elections do not produce representation. We demonstrate that elections in which incumbents win by landslides yield Representatives who are ideologically closer to their voters than elections with narrow margins. Furthermore, we demonstrate that ideological proximity to one's Representative creates feelings of trust and efficacy, but that competitive elections do not. In fact, since competitive elections produce ideological distance between voters and their Representatives, and that distance produces dissatisfaction, competitive elections indirectly reduce voters' feelings of trust and efficacy. Thus, competitive elections are paradoxically harmful to representation.     

Understanding the Relationship between Health PACs and Health Lobbying in the American States

We examine how health PAC activity in the states is connectedto lobbying. Is the political money that health interest organizationsbring to the policy process a powerful, independent means ofinfluence or is it better understood narrowly as a tactic usedto support lobbying? We examine the relationship between campaigncontributions and lobby activity and the limited work that hasbeen conducted on them and raise a number of questions aboutthe process by which they are connected. We utilize 1998 dataon state lobbying and PAC activity, allowing us to answer causalresearch questions generated from existing studies at the nationallevel. We conclude that PAC activity is best viewed as an adjunctof lobbying rather than an independent form of political activity.     

The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey and Administrative Statistics

Abstract

Across multiple African countries, discrepancies between administrative data and independent household surveys suggest official statistics systematically exaggerate development progress. We provide evidence for two distinct explanations of these discrepancies. First, governments misreport to foreign donors, as in the case of a results-based aid programme rewarding reported vaccination rates. Second, national governments are themselves misled by frontline service providers, as in the case of primary education, where official enrolment numbers diverged from survey estimates after funding shifted from user fees to per pupil government grants. Both syndromes highlight the need for incentive compatibility between data systems and funding rules.     

Social Influences on Cyberbullying Behaviors Among Middle and High School Students

Cyberbullying is a problem affecting a meaningful proportion of youth as they embrace online communication and interaction. Research has identified a number of real-world negative ramifications for both the targets and those who bully. During adolescence, many behavioral choices are influenced and conditioned by the role of major socializing agents, including friends, family, and adults at school. The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which peers, parents, and educators influence the cyberbullying behaviors of adolescents. To explore this question, data were analyzed from a random sample of approximately 4,400 sixth through twelfth grade students (49 % female; 63 % nonwhite) from thirty-three schools in one large school district in the southern United States. Results indicate that cyberbullying offending is associated with perceptions of peers behaving similarly, and the likelihood of sanction by adults. Specifically, youth who believed that many of their friends were involved in bullying and cyberbullying were themselves more likely to report cyberbullying behaviors. At the same time, respondents who believed that the adults in their life would punish them for cyberbullying were less likely to participate. Implications for schools and families are discussed with the goal of mitigating this behavior and its negative outcomes among adolescent populations.     

Survival of the Fairest: Examining HUD Reviews of Assessments of Fair Housing

ABSTRACT

In 2015, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) Rule, arguably the most significant federal effort in a generation to address place-based disparities in access to opportunity and to advance fair housing. In 2018, HUD suspended the rule, it said in part because of the resources it was expending to implement it and in part because of the large share of municipal plans that HUD determined had failed to meet the rule’s requirements. In this article, we present the first analysis of the fair housing plans that HUD did not accept, examining how municipalities failed to meet the rule's requirements, what those failures imply about advancing fair housing, and the extent to which HUD’s enforcement strategy was working before the suspension. Our analysis shows that HUD engaged in detailed reviews of municipalities’ Assessments of Fair Housing and provided constructive feedback. The most common issue with which municipalities struggled was setting realistic goals that would actually advance fair housing and creating measurable metrics and milestones to gauge progress. Several municipalities neglected to conduct thorough regional analyses or analyses of all relevant disparities in access to opportunity. Both shortcomings reflect broader challenges municipalities face in advancing fair housing, particularly in identifying strategies that address interconnected causes of disparities in access to opportunity and in building regional support to address those causes.     

How did the disclosure of lobbying targeting Quebec's hospitals become mandatory and with what effect?

In 2015 mandatory disclosure activity for lobbying that targeted health and social service centres in Quebec, a sector which consumes a significant share of the annual spending budget, suddenly became a mandatory disclosure activity for lobbyists operating in the province. This research note traces the trajectory of key events that led to this shift towards greater lobbying transparency in the health care sector. The study also analyzes whether this change was followed by increased lobbying registrations for activities targeting health sector institutions. The article's findings suggest that significant change in lobbying regulation may occur accidentally, against the government's will, rather than as a result of an ethical scandal, cross-jurisdictional learning, or electoral calculations, as the literature suggests. The article's findings also show that the change was followed by an increase of about 969 registered firm lobbyists (p-value 0.015) and 254 registered lobbyists from covered NGOs (p-value 0.00).