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BARGAIN AND BLUFF: Compliance Strategy and Deterrence in the Enforcement of Regulation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
KEITH HAWKINS 《Law & policy》1983,5(1):35-73
A strategy of compliance in which enforcement agents rely on negotiation is identified as a characteristic feature of water pollution control work. The strategy arises from the nature of the conduct and activities subject to regulation and from the need to maintain a continuing relationship with the regulated. In securing compliance regulatory agents shape their enforcement tactics by reference to assumptions held as to why polluters fail to comply. Bargaining is central to compliance strategy, but if a conciliatory approach fails, a more threatening posture will be taken in which a variety of mores, including bluffs about legal sanctions, may be employed. Law enforcement is treated as a matter of compliance as well as compulsion. 相似文献
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NICOLE BOLLEYER RAIMONDAS IBENSKAS DANIEL KEITH 《European Journal of Political Research》2016,55(3):642-659
Why do constituent parties that participated in a party merger that was intended to be permanent decide to leave the merger to re‐enter party competition separately? To address this question, merger termination is conceptualised in this article as an instance of new party formation, coalition termination and institutionalisation failure. Building on this conceptualisation, three sets of factors are presented that account for which mergers are likely to be terminated by constituent parties and which are not. To test these three sets of hypotheses, a mixed‐methods design is used. First, survival analysis is applied to a new dataset on the performance of mergers in 21 European democracies during the postwar period. The findings support hypotheses derived from a conception of merger termination as new party formation: pre‐ and post‐merger legislative performance significantly affect the probability of merger termination. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of constituent parties helps to sustain mergers if the latter already built trust in pre‐merger cooperation, in line with the conception of merger termination as institutionalisation failure. Two theory‐confirming case studies are then analysed: one case of merger survival and the other of termination. These case studies substantiate the working of the significant variables identified in the large‐N analysis that drove the selection of case studies. They also reveal how mediating factors difficult to capture in large‐N designs help to account for why factors that – theoretically – should have complicated the working of the ‘survival case’, and should have been beneficial to the ‘termination case’, did not generate the expected effects. 相似文献
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This paper considers business adaptation to legal regulation from an enforcement perspective. It is argued that regulatory agencies and business have a reflexive relationship in which there is a continual process of adaptation and readaptation by one party and then the other. This reflexivity and its implications are discussed with reference to socio-legal research into the regulation of occupational health and safety and environmental pollution in England and Wales. 相似文献
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Abstract: Motivated by the U.S. Congress's motion to recommit with instructions to report forthwith, we analyze a simple spatial model to clarify the relationship between early‐stage agenda‐setting rights of a committee or the majority party, a late‐stage minimum parliamentary right of the minority party or a noncommittee member, and the distribution of power over outcomes. The extent to which certain parliamentary rights empower agents is dependent on the relative locations of the exogenous status quo and the preferences of the legislators. We derive comparative statics on the relationship between proposal order and power by considering a model that allows preference heterogeneity and status quo centrality to vary. Finally, we relate the findings to recurring substantive debates on majority party power and committee power. 相似文献
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