Comparing NOMINATE and IDEAL: Points of Difference and Monte Carlo Tests

Empirical models of spatial voting allow us to infer legislators' locations in an abstract policy or ideological space using their roll‐call votes. Over the past 25 years, these models have provided new insights about the U.S. Congress, and legislative behavior more generally. There are now a number of alternative models, estimators, and software packages that researchers can use to recover latent issue or ideological spaces from voting data. These different tools usually produce substantively similar estimates, but important differences also arise. We investigated the sources of observed differences between two leading methods, NOMINATE and IDEAL. Using data from the 1994 to 1997 Supreme Court and the 109th Senate, we determined that while some observed differences in the estimates produced by each model stem from fundamental differences in the models' underlying behavioral assumptions, others arise from arbitrary differences in implementation. Our Monte Carlo experiments revealed that neither model has a clear advantage over the other in the recovery of legislator locations or roll‐call midpoints in either large or small legislatures.     

Partisan Stacking on Legislative Committees

One aspect of the partisan model for legislative committee development that is rarely studied is the degree to which the majority party seeks to control legislative committees—and, thereby, chamber decisions—via numerically “overproportional” majority party representation on standing committees. This form of “party stacking” is often mentioned in the literature but has received little systematic examination and hypothesis testing. Using data from state legislative committees for all 49 partisan legislatures in the 2003–04 and 2005–06 sessions, we found support for the partisan model: majority party stacking is associated with a slim majority party advantage in a state legislative chamber.     

Congressional Party Defection in American History

In this paper, we analyze the roll‐call voting behavior of House and Senate members who changed party affiliation during the course of their political careers. We analyze members who switched during the stable periods of the three major two‐party systems in American history: the Federalist‐Jeffersonian Republican system (3d to 12th Congresses), the Democratic‐Whig System (20th to 30th Congresses), and the Democratic‐Republican System (46th to 106th Congresses). Our primary findings are that the biggest changes in the roll‐call voting behavior of party defectors can be observed during periods of high ideological polarization and that party defections during the past 30 years are distinct from switches in other eras because of high polarization and the disappearance of a second dimension of ideological conflict.     

THE VALUE OF CHOICE IN PUBLIC POLICY

Conceptualizing and measuring choice is problematic both in theory and in practice. Measuring by counting the alternatives seems counter-intuitive as a smaller set of better or more diverse alternatives seems to provide more choice than one that is simply larger. However, concentrating upon better alternatives leads to choice being defined by welfare or utility which is also counter-intuitive. The implications of this paradox are considered in relation to examples drawn from the choice agenda in British social policy. Empirical difficulties in measuring the welfare gains through implementing greater choice at a time of other central-led policy initiatives such as targets are discussed, and the extant evidence discussed. Criteria for judging whether or not choice has been welfare-enhancing are suggested. It is argued that 'soft choice' where service providers provide information and explain different options is preferable to 'hard' choice of simplistic targets to increase choice by ticking target boxes.     

TOWARDS AN EXOGENOUS THEORY OF PUBLIC NETWORK PERFORMANCE

This article offers insights into the complexity of assessing the performance of public networks. We have identified three so-called exogenous factors: form of the network, type of inception—whether the network was initially formed as voluntary or mandated—and developmental stage of the network. We argue that where a network stands on each of these factors will determine the appropriateness of specific criteria for assessing the performance of the network.