Equality and efficiency: The illusory tradeoff

Abstract. Scholars and policy makers have traditionally assumed that nations face a tradeoff between income equality and economic efficiency. Greater equality is believed to reduce investment and dampen work incentives. A heterodox view suggests that a more egalitarian distribution of income may have beneficial efficiency effects by augmenting consumer demand and/or encouraging workers to cooperate in upgrading competitiveness. This paper offers an empirical assessment of the relationship between equality and efficiency, based on cross-sectional data from 17 advanced industrialized economies over the period 1974–90. The comparative evidence indicates no adverse impact of greater equality on investment or work effort, nor on growth of productivity or output, trade balances, inflation, or unemployment. On the contrary, higher levels of equality are associated with stronger productivity growth and trade performance, and possibly with higher investment and lower inflation.     

OFFICER-MEMBER RELATIONS IN COUNTY-LEVEL POLICY-MAKING FOR RURAL AREAS: THE CASE OF THE GLQUCESTERSHIRE STRUCTURE PLAN

Studies of rural planning have only recently begun to focus on concepts of policy-making and implementation which have been developed in urban and regional contexts. Although recognizing the need for inter-organizational frameworks, this paper investigates one particular factor in policy-making – officer-member relations – as illustrated in the structure plan-making process of Gloucestershire County Council. Through a partnership between senior officers who were able to orchestrate decision-making, and elite members who provided political support for technical policy justifications, a form of directed policy consensus was reached. The consensus in this particular structure plan was marked by the prominence of a political-bureaucratic goal to provide policy-responses to rural problems. This theme was diluted, however, when the plan moved from the local to the central arena of power.