THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: A Policy Evaluation

The success rate of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is evaluated in the light of 42 years of experience under them and of alternative modes of adjucating civil disputes. The intentions of the rules' framers are explored as are hypotheses as to why they have been only partially successful. On the basis of this analysis, the author argues that adversary presentation and prosecution must be modified in the direction of a system of direct inquiry by the court and of active judicial management of disputes to settlement or trial.     

Legislative Victory, Electoral Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the Battles over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights

Previous studies indicate that in cases of relatively low issue salience, the interest group model best explains lesbian and gay antidiscrimination policy in the American states. The analysis of state and local public policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation concludes that for cases of high issue salience, the morality politics model best describes outcomes. The interest group politics model is used here in a case study of Wisconsin's passage of a comprehensive antidiscrimination policy, while the morality politics model is used to investigate the electoral outcomes of anti‐gay ballot initiatives in several states. The results of this analysis conform with prior research—when lesbian and gay issues are not salient, the interest group politics model best explains resulting policy, however, under salient conditions, the morality politics model best describes outcomes. Finally, the implications of this research for social scientists and activists are discussed.     

Candidates' policy platforms and election outcomes: The three faces of policy representation

Abstract.   Recent empirical studies by Alvarez and Nagler, Erikson and Romero, and others conclude that candidates' and parties' policy platforms only modestly affect their electoral support. This suggests that candidates/parties can win elections even when their policies differ sharply from the policy beliefs of the constituencies that elect them. This raises the question: How can voters exercise control over government policies via elections? We report applications to American and French presidential election data that suggest three paradoxical conclusions. On the one hand, we find that presidential candidates can moderate their policies with at most a modest change in vote share, but if they move by the same amount to a more extreme position, they face severe vote losses that could cripple their election prospects. Alternatively, movement by both candidates in the same direction or a policy shift by the voters may have a major effect on the outcome.     

The Government of Health Care and the Politics of Patient Empowerment: New Labour and the NHS Reform Agenda in England

This article considers the issue of patient empowerment in the context of New Labour's proposed reforms to the National Health Service (NHS) in England. Through an exploration of some of the key measures in the government's white paper High Quality Care for All, the article argues for a conceptualization of patient empowerment as a political technique of governing. Patient empowerment, it is contended, can no longer be understood solely as a quantitative phenomenon to be balanced within the doctor‐patient relationship. Rather, its deployment by the government as a way of governing health and health care more broadly demands that we consider what political functions—including, importantly, it is argued here, managing the problem of the increasing cost of illness and health care—patient empowerment may be involved in performing. In order to assist in this enquiry, the article draws on some of Michel Foucault's work on the art of governing. It is suggested that his understanding of the neoliberal mode of governing best captures the proposed changes to the NHS and the role patient empowerment plays in their implementation.     

BEWARE OF MANAGERS NOT BEARING GIFTS: HOW MANAGEMENT CAPACITY AUGMENTS THE IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL NETWORKING

Networks and managing in the network have been central concerns of public management scholars for years ( Provan and Milward 1991 ; O’Toole 1997 ; Agranoff and McGuire 2003 ; Herranz 2008 ). The literature has investigated the extent of networks ( Hall and O’Toole 2004 ), the appropriate way to measure networks and networking behaviour ( McGuire 2002 ; Meier and O’Toole 2005 ), and the role that networking plays in improving organizational performance ( O’Toole and Meier 2003 ). Although there are qualifications in the literature to the rosy scenario that managing in the network is always a good thing ( O’Toole and Meier 2004 ), and although the benefits of managerial networking show diminishing returns ( Hicklin et al. 2008 ), there has not been much investigation of the factors that enhance or detract from networking's impact on performance. This study examines the interactive relationship between management capacity and managerial networking using a panel of several hundred public organizations over an 8‐year period. The empirical results show that managerial capacity does interact with networking and enhances the positive impact of networking over an array of performance indicators. At the same time, building managerial capacity is a central management choice, and that decision has ramifications for organizations that are not always positive. The paper concludes with the managerial implications of the strategic choice to build management capacity.     

Divided Government: America is Not "Exceptional"

America is thought to be an exceptional political system, and, in many of its particulars, it certainly differs from the institutional arrangements found in most of the world's democracies. Its separation-of-powers regime is thought to have spawned, in recent decades, the phenomenon of divided government in which partisan control of political institutions is divided between the major parties. By implication, it is suggested that this robust regularity in which Democrats control the legislature and Republicans the executive is a consequence of its institutional arrangements and, therefore, distinguishes America from its parliamentary counterparts elsewhere. In this article, the authors suggest that parliamentary regimes, too, experience divided government. Specifically, minority governments, in which the executive is controlled by parties that, between them, control less than a legislative majority, is the closest analogue to divided government in America. In each case, the executive needs to seek support in the legislature beyond its own partisan base. Thus, divided government per se does not distinguish parliamentary and separation-of-powers regimes. What does, however, are the constitutional roots of this phenomenon: divided governments are negotiated in parliamentary regimes whereas they are mandated electorally in separation-of-powers regimes.