Can International Boycotts Transform Political Systems? The Cases of Cuba and South Africa

The economic embargo against Cuba has been widely promoted as a way to hasten the end of the Castro regime. Historically, however, the connection between embargoes and regime change is mediated by a complex of political, social, and economic conditions. Labormarket bottlenecks and domestic elite opposition, decisive factors in the South African case, are absent from that of Cuba. This study uses the factors derived from an analysis of South Africa to compare the Cuban case and concludes that the embargo against Cuba cannot have its intended results.     

Information Handling Challenges in Complex Systems

ABSTRACT:

Even when leaders exhibit desirable leadership styles, the effectiveness of their behaviors on organizational outcomes may be influenced by the structural distance between them and their followers. Nonetheless, previous empirical research on the relationships between leadership styles and outcomes has largely ignored the role of leader distance in public administration. Using panel data drawn from the US federal government, this study explores how transformational and transactional leadership styles affect employee turnover behavior and how span of control as a proxy for leader distance moderates those relationships. The statistical results indicate that transformational leadership is negatively related to turnover behavior, whereas transactional leadership is positively related to turnover behavior. Further analysis shows that span of control significantly moderates the relationships between the two leadership styles and employee turnover behavior such that organizations benefit more from transformational leaders with a broad span of control than from those with a narrow span of control. Conversely, transactional leaders with a narrow span of control are better at reducing turnover than those with a broad span of control. The implications and contributions of these results for public administration are discussed.     

WINNING ESSAY: 1998 LAW SCHOOL ESSAY CONTEST

Courts are frequently confronted with children who, regardless of court orders, refuse to visit their noncustodial parents. This article examines the possible alternatives to holding a child, or parent, in contempt for such behavior. Furthermore, solutions and ideas that better serve the needs of children and parents in these highly volatile family situations will also be explored .     

THE FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS ON FAMILY LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH

Editor's note on the 5^th World Congress on Family Law and Children's Rights held in Halifax Nova Scotia, August 23–26, 2009     

A Comparison of Forensic and Nonforensic Malingerers: A Prototypical Analysis of Explanatory Models

Explanatory models of malingering strive to understand the primary motivation underlying attempts to feign. Rogers, Sewell, and Goldstein (1994) provided empirical support for the conceptualization of pathogenic, criminological, and adaptational models. In the current study, a prototypical analysis of 221 forensic experts results in a slightly refined formulation: the adaptational model was decomposed into its two broad dimensions (cost–benefit analysis and adversarial setting). An important finding is that the factor structure for the explanatory models remained stable when applied to both forensic and nonforensic cases. As a first investigation, significant differences were observed in prototypical cases of malingering by the category of referral (forensic or nonforensic) and by type of feigning (mental disorders, cognitive impairment, and medical syndromes). Surprisingly, the feigning of medical syndromes appeared to play a relatively prominent role in both forensic and nonforensic cases and to be influenced by the apparent adversarial context of the assessment. Finally, important gender differences were observed, especially with nonforensic prototypical cases of malingering.     

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification foreminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood.This article models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework,where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land fora large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminentdomain, holdouts are a significant threat, resulting in costlydelay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminentdomain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain,thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiateprices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessivetransfer of land to the developer.     

The effectiveness of NGO self‐regulation: theory and evidence from Africa

Non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) play an increasingly important role in public service provision and policy making in sub‐Saharan Africa, stimulating demand for new forms of regulatory oversight. In response, a number of initiatives in NGO self‐regulation have emerged. Using cross‐national data on 20 African countries, the article shows that self‐regulation in Africa falls into three types: national‐level guilds, NGO‐led clubs and voluntary codes of conduct. Each displays significant weaknesses from a regulatory policy perspective. National guilds have a broad scope, but require high administrative oversight capacity on the part of NGOs. Voluntary clubs have stronger standards but typically have much weaker coverage. Voluntary codes are the most common form of self‐regulation, but have the weakest regulatory strength. This article argues that the weakness of current attempts to improve the accountability and regulatory environment of NGOs stems in part from a mismatch between the goals of regulation and the institutional incentives embedded in the structure of most self‐regulatory regimes. The article uses the logic of collective action to illustrate the nature of this mismatch and the tradeoffs between the potential breadth and strength of various forms of NGO self‐regulation using three detailed case studies. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.