Public opinion and presidential responsibility for the economy: Understanding personalization

The general mechanisms which underlie the psychological phenomenon ofpersonalizing (cognitive simplification and defensive attribution) would seem to have great utility in explaining attributions of presidential control over the economy. Yet previous research has generated inconsistent and inconclusive empirical results. This study identifies several sources of inconsistency and then attempts to clarify the approach by focusing separately on the object and the subject of personalizing. Our findings suggest that the determinants of personalizing to the president are different from the factors that explain personalizing to the incumbent. In addition, we find that the impact of the two psychological mechanisms differs substantially within economic subject areas.Paper prepared for delivery at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Fort Worth, Texas.     

The primary investigation of material evidence and the evaluation of its suitability for expert biological identification by genomic "dactyloscopy"

Use of DNA "fingerprinting" method for biological analysis of material evidences exhibit new potentials for making concrete expert conclusions. But such expertise is time consuming and difficult to perform that's why it is important to evaluate fitness of expert material for DNA fingerprinting at early stages of object investigation. Method of preliminary treatment of objects sent for DNA fingerprint expertise in case of sexual assault is suggested and tested. This method allows one to evaluate objects easily from the standpoint of possibility to perform such investigation.     

Strategies of Resistance: Diversification and Diffusion

Why do organizations choose to use nonviolence? Why do they choose specific nonviolent tactics? Existing quantitative work centers on mass nonviolent campaign, but much of the nonviolence employed in contentious politics is smaller‐scale nonviolent direct action. In this article, we explore the determinants of nonviolence with new data at the organization level in self‐determination disputes from 1960 to 2005. We present a novel argument about the interdependence of tactical choices among nonviolent options in self‐determination movements. Given limitations on their capabilities, competition among organizations in a shared movement, and different resource requirements for nonviolent strategies, we show that organizations have incentives to diversify tactics rather than just copy other organizations. The empirical analysis reveals a rich picture of varied organizational resistance choices, and a complex web of interdependence among tactics.     

The Psychology of Coercion Failure: How Reactance Explains Resistance to Threats

When confronted with coercive threats, targets often stand firm rather than back down. We identify one important yet unrecognized factor that causes actors to resist threats: psychological reactance. Reactance theory explains that when someone perceives a threat to their freedom to make choices, they attempt to restore their autonomy by refusing to capitulate. The result is unwillingness to concede to coercion that extends beyond rational incentives. We test for reactance as a cause of coercion failure with two novel experiments. Each experiment pairs a coercive threat treatment with a matched “natural costs” counterpart that imposes the same choice on the target without intentional action by a coercer. Controlling for prominent alternative explanations, including costs, benefits, power, credibility, and reputation, we find that the targets of threats capitulate less frequently and more often support aggression against their opponents.     

South Africa's integration efforts within the Southern African Development Community: Regional supremacy or coalition?

Regional integration has manifested itself to be an integral part of Africa's postcolonial economic growth blueprints. It was viewed as a mechanism for African states to enhance their development and work collectively, improve their cooperation, and enhance peace and security. Nevertheless, regional integration initiatives are often seen to succeed when spearheaded by regional hegemons. By narrowing this to southern Africa, from 1994 after the first-ever democratic elections and after also becoming a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), South Africa was regarded as a state capable of spearheading regional integration. This was a result of its relatively robust economy and military power in comparison with other SADC states. As a result, it was poised to utilize these vast resources to the benefit of the SADC. However, over the last two and a half decades, its regional stance has often come under a lot of scrutinizing due to its ambiguous foreign policy doctrine, particularly in southern Africa. Basically, its post-1994 foreign policy projections towards the region have often not been implemented as attested and have often lacked clear articulation. Nevertheless, this paper argues that South Africa has made positive strides in the SADC's regional integration endeavors post its democratic transition. Its vast regional investments and diplomatic and military interventions have played a crucial role in the development and security reforms in the region. Although it is portrayed as a regional hegemon, it has nevertheless used its regional standpoint to the benefit of the region and further contributed to regional integration post the apartheid era.