World Risk Society and War Against Terror

I interpret the 'war against terror', declared following September 11 2001, as adopting concepts drawn from the work of Ulrich Beck, as a projection of world risk society. Despite its global character, war against terror is constructed through outmoded vocabularies of national security and sovereignty, within which the reasoned negotiation of risk is marginalized. This exclusion contributes to the intensification rather than reduction of terror and terrorism. In so doing the moment of violence inscribed within the concept of the political resurfaces in the constitution of war against terror, Homeland Security, and the identities and anxieties that they reproduce. Contrary to Slavoj Žižek's claim that risk society is incapable of resolving the dilemmas that it exposes, Beck's approach cuts across established ideological and methodological boundaries, anticipating key transformations of discourse required to address the prevailing global predicament through the vocabularies and logic of cosmopolitan risk, rather than those of absolute security, terror and war.     

Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism

This article describes a number of possible existential motivations for engaging in terrorism. Three in particular are identified: (1) the desire for excitement, (2) the desire for ultimate meaning, and (3) the desire for glory. Terrorism, according to the argument set out here, is as much a site of individual self-drama and self-reinvention as a tactical instrument for pursuing the political goals of small groups. The conclusion explores the concept of “existential frustration,” and suggests that terrorist activity may provide an outlet for basic existential desires that cannot find expression through legitimate channels.     

Extravagance and mediocrity of virtue: Their divergence and the possibility of demagoguery

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle refers to Socrates five times: four references are to the contentious Socratic doctrine that “virtue is knowledge” the fifth is in the discussion of irony, “such as that of which Socrates was accused.” These issues are not conjoined accidentally. “Manifest appearances” attest that we can do worse than we know or know better than we do. Yet, the “problem of incontinence'’ is only half of the problem of the divergence of character and intellect, the mediocre and the extravagant in virtue. The other half of the problem is the capacity of some to do or act better than they know, vice's ability to imitate virtue, the disloyal talent's employment of demagoguery, the clever vice of irony.