Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory, and Downstream Competition

Under plausible circumstances, a monopolist in one market canuse its control of prices in that market to force competingdownstream buyers to sign tying contracts that will lever itsmonopoly into another market. Specifically, the monopolist ofthe tying good can place each downstream buyer in a prisoner'sdilemma by offering them more favorable pricing on the tyinggood if they sign a requirements-tying contract covering thetied good. Since a buyer benefits on receiving more favorablepricing on the tying good and the competitors do not, and suffersif the competitors receive more favorable pricing on the tyinggood and the buyer does not, buyers will sign the tying contracteven when they would earn higher profits if they all refusedto sign. This enables a monopolist in one market to inefficientlyexclude an entrant in another market.     

Destructive Competition or Competition Destroyed? Regulatory Theory and the History of Irish Road Transportation Legislation

The principal aim of our study is to contribute to the debate over whether regulation is enacted in the interest of consumers, producers, political agents, or some combination of these. We examine the legislative debates and subsequent regulatory bills surrounding road transportation regulation in Ireland in light of the three dominant theories which purport to explain the existence of regulation: the public interest theory and the so-called Chicago and Virginia theories. A unique feature of our study is an attempt to integrate specific rhetorical concepts used in the public policy debates into the theoretical analysis of regulation. One noteworthy conclusion of our study is that theories of economic processes affect the shaping and results of public policy.     

Implementing Change in an Urban School District: A Case Study of the Reorganization of the Little Rock School District

In July 2005, the Little Rock, Arkansas, school district implemented a new policy to reorganize its management structure in order to create a more efficient bureaucracy. Using Richard Matland’s ambiguity‐conflict model of policy implementation, the authors examine the implementation of this school reorganization policy. Interviews and surveys were conducted with the superintendent and his executive assistants, school principals, teachers, and staff. In line with Matland’s model, the findings suggest that successful implementation is directly related to the policy characteristics of ambiguity and conflict. However, the authors point to the importance of recognizing particular characteristics for different groups of stakeholders within the policy implementation process. Discrepancies among groups of policy actors in the degree of policy ambiguity and policy conflict lead to strikingly different implementation strategies.     

Ministerial Resignations 1945–97

This article reports on data collected on ministerial resignations and non-resignations 1945–1997. It analyses the reasons why ministers resign and patterns that emerge in terms of the types of issues that are more likely to lead to resignation, and variances between different Prime Ministers, parties and over time. It provides the first fully quantified analysis of ministerial resignations in Britain in the post-war period to enhance the impressionistic analyses which have been offered before.