Transactional telematics in the city

Barriers to women's progress in senior management are often referred to as ‘the glass ceiling ‘. This research investigated these barriers in one local authority where an equal opportunities policy was well established. Interviews with employees in six departments focused on perceptions of and experiences of women in senior management. This study provides some evidence that change has taken place and staff in some departments suggest that a new climate of working relations has been fostered through policies and training. This change continues to be mainly limited to non‐management grades. This research questions why there are so few women in senior management in the local authority and raises issues about their experiences.     

Beginning an ‘Extraordinary Opportunity’: Eleanor Roosevelt,Molly Dewson,and the expansion of women's boundaries in the Democratic Party, 1924–1934

This article contributes to recent reinterpretations of women's participation in the United States' political system in the 1920s and 1930s by arguing that the years 1924 through 1934 demonstrated an expansion of female boundaries in the Democratic Party. Eleanor Roosevelt became the first agent in this process through her involvement in both the New York State Democratic Party and in social justice feminism. Her protégée, Molly Dewson, continued the expansion as the first full-time director of the Women's Division of the Democratic National Committee, also helping to re-establish social justice feminism's national prominence.     

BARGAINING OVER FIXED-TO-MOBILE TERMINATION RATES: COUNTERVAILING BUYER POWER AS A CONSTRAINT ON MONOPOLY POWER

The conventional wisdom that mobile operators are able to actas monopolists in pricing call termination on their networkshas recently been challenged by Hutchison 3G's entry into Europeanmobile markets. The European Commission's electronic communicationsregime allows national regulatory authorities to regulate mobiletermination rates if an operator is found to possess ‘significantmarket power’. This requires that the mobile operatornot be constrained by the ‘countervailing buyer power’of incumbents. The claim that incumbent operators possess countervailingbuyer power has been dismissed repeatedly because of their obligationto interconnect with other networks. This conclusion is erroneous.We analyse bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination ratesand demonstrate that the existence of an interconnectivity obligationis entirely consistent with new entrants such as Hutchison 3Ghaving no market power at all in pricing call termination ontheir own networks.