Party finance in Russia: Has the 2001 law ‘on political parties’ made a difference?

The 2001 law ‘On political parties’ instituted several substantive changes to party finance in Russia. This article examines these elements of the law on parties, which have so far received little attention, to ascertain the aims of this party-funding reform, the extent to which these aims have been realised, and what impact—if any—the financial terms of the law have had on party finance. The article draws on new sources, namely parties' annual financial accounts, to shed fresh light on party funding in Russia and on the presidential administration's attitude to party finance.     

中东石油出口流向变化及对中国的影响

中东是世界上储、产石油最丰富的地区,也是最重要的石油出口区。石油危机前,中东石油出口主要流向欧、美等国家和地区;石油危机后,中东石油出口流向主要由向西方转为向东方,亚太新兴工业国家在中东石油出口中所占的比重上升;20世纪90年代,世界政治形势的变化使这种世界石油贸易新格局得到进一步加强,中东石油的出口方向主要是东亚和南亚。世界石油贸易格局的重大变化,为中国与中东国家加大石油领域的合作提供了机遇。同时,中国也应借鉴西欧国家的经验,坚持节能及发展可再生资源、实现进口来源多元化的能源和油气发展战略。     

马来人的服饰

服饰是全世界穆斯林区别于其他宗教信仰者的重要特征之一,但由于每个国家和地区的穆斯林都要受当地文化传统和社会环境的影响,因此,他们在服饰上呈现出丰富多彩的面貌。本文主要介绍了马来西亚马来穆斯林的日常服饰,希望由此揭示出人类文化的多样性,并在一定程度上反映出地方政治环境对人们的服饰规则的影响。     

Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking

Recent formal models of legislatures have proved that equilibrium outcomes are extremely unlikely without either (1) extreme restrictions upon preferences or (2) constraints upon the agenda. The implication is that constant instability or dictatorial manipulation is the norm in politics. This paper argues to the contrary, that legislatures (and other political processes) are characterized by some regularities, and that equilibrium models are the appropriate technique to use in describing these regularities. Examples from economic theory are used to illustrate this principle. The assumption of equilibrium is methodological, committing the researcher to develop models that have specific empirical implications. Using analogies from the economic theories of general equilibrium, oligopoly, and demand revealing processes, some potentially fruitful means of developing equilibrium political models are described. Assuming that legislators may freely make binding contracts has both empirical and normative advantages. Finally, institutional restrictions on legislative agendas may assure equilibrium. These include ‘constitutional’ rules, agreements to share ‘pork barrel’ projects evenly, limitation of committees to specific policy arenas, and the election of leaders who then determine the voting agenda.