Impacts of abstinence education on teen sexual activity, risk of pregnancy, and risk of sexually transmitted diseases.

This paper examines the impacts of four abstinence-only education programs on adolescent sexual activity and risks of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Based on an experimental design, the impact analysis uses survey data collected in 2005 and early 2006 from more than 2,000 teens who had been randomly assigned to either a program group that was eligible to participate in one of the four programs or a control group that was not. The findings show no significant impact on teen sexual activity, no differences in rates of unprotected sex, and some impacts on knowledge of STDs and perceived effectiveness of condoms and birth control pills     

Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Criminal Law? Explaining and Defending the Distinction

This article makes six points. First, under any plausible normative perspective, the distinction between mistake (and ignorance) of criminal law and mistake of fact must at least sometimes be drawn. Second, the fundamental distinction is between a mistake about the state’s authoritative statement of what is prohibited (“M Law”), and a mistake about whether that prohibitory norm is instantiated in a particular case (“M Fact”). Third, when an actor makes a mistake about an evaluative criterion whose content the fact-finder has discretion to elaborate, it is impossible both to allow this discretion and to faithfully realize a jurisdiction’s policy of treating M Fact and M Law differently. Fourth, the claim that every unreasonable M Fact is really a M Law elides important differences between the two kinds of mistake. Fifth, various borderline objections, such as the famous Mr. Fact/Mr. Law example, do not undermine the fundamental distinction, although in rare instances, they do constitute genuine counterexamples that do not effectuate the principles and policies that the distinction ordinarily serves; and even here, they are exceptions that prove (the rationale for) the rule. Sixth, specification or evolution of a criminal law norm, such as the criterion for nonconsent in rape law, can convert a legally relevant M Fact into a legally irrelevant M Law. This phenomenon does not undermine the fundamental distinction between these types of mistake; to the contrary, it reveals the significance of that distinction.     

The Language of Miranda Warnings in American Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis

Miranda warnings are remarkably heterogeneous in their language, length, and content. Past research has focused mostly on individual Miranda warnings. Lacking in generalizability, these studies have limited applicability to both public policy and professional practice. A large-scale survey by R. Rogers et al. [2007b, Law and Human Behavior, 31, 177-192] examined Miranda warnings from across the United States and documented striking differences in the length, content, and reading comprehension. In moving from single jurisdiction studies to nationally representative research, the replication of the Rogers et al. survey is essential. With an additional 385 general Miranda warnings, most of the original findings were confirmed; this replication allows Miranda researchers to use findings based upon nationally-representative warnings for their subsequent research. Beyond reading comprehension, the study makes an original contribution to the understanding of Miranda vocabulary that is often infused with abstruse words and legalistic terms. It provides the first analysis of sentence complexity, which affects both Miranda comprehension and retention. As a result of these analyses, preliminary guidelines are provided for increasing the comprehension and understanding of Miranda warnings.     

Being Ms B: B, autonomy and the nature of legal regulation

In this article, we question the apparent simplicity of medical law's construction of 'life and death' cases as a clash between the sanctity of life principle and patient autonomy. Our main purpose in doing so is to try to understand more fully the nature of law's regulation of the existence and non-existence of life. Specifically, we argue that, by broadening the understanding of autonomy in this area beyond a simple concern for patients' rights and self-determination, to include a focus on the individual generally, it becomes possible to identify some of the legal practices that are central to the manner in which law regulates the threshold between life and death. Through an analysis of a recent case in English law--Re B (an adult: refusal of medical treatment)--(although Australian jurisdictions presently disclose no similar, authoritative case, ours presently is almost an arbitrary choice)--we demonstrate the central role played in this regulation by tests for mental capacity, questions of character, explanation, and imagination. We conclude that medical law, at least in this context, can be theorised as a normalising practice--one in which the determination of norms often occurs through patients.