Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Criminal Law? Explaining and Defending the Distinction

This article makes six points. First, under any plausible normative perspective, the distinction between mistake (and ignorance) of criminal law and mistake of fact must at least sometimes be drawn. Second, the fundamental distinction is between a mistake about the state’s authoritative statement of what is prohibited (“M Law”), and a mistake about whether that prohibitory norm is instantiated in a particular case (“M Fact”). Third, when an actor makes a mistake about an evaluative criterion whose content the fact-finder has discretion to elaborate, it is impossible both to allow this discretion and to faithfully realize a jurisdiction’s policy of treating M Fact and M Law differently. Fourth, the claim that every unreasonable M Fact is really a M Law elides important differences between the two kinds of mistake. Fifth, various borderline objections, such as the famous Mr. Fact/Mr. Law example, do not undermine the fundamental distinction, although in rare instances, they do constitute genuine counterexamples that do not effectuate the principles and policies that the distinction ordinarily serves; and even here, they are exceptions that prove (the rationale for) the rule. Sixth, specification or evolution of a criminal law norm, such as the criterion for nonconsent in rape law, can convert a legally relevant M Fact into a legally irrelevant M Law. This phenomenon does not undermine the fundamental distinction between these types of mistake; to the contrary, it reveals the significance of that distinction.     

The Language of Miranda Warnings in American Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis

Miranda warnings are remarkably heterogeneous in their language, length, and content. Past research has focused mostly on individual Miranda warnings. Lacking in generalizability, these studies have limited applicability to both public policy and professional practice. A large-scale survey by R. Rogers et al. [2007b, Law and Human Behavior, 31, 177-192] examined Miranda warnings from across the United States and documented striking differences in the length, content, and reading comprehension. In moving from single jurisdiction studies to nationally representative research, the replication of the Rogers et al. survey is essential. With an additional 385 general Miranda warnings, most of the original findings were confirmed; this replication allows Miranda researchers to use findings based upon nationally-representative warnings for their subsequent research. Beyond reading comprehension, the study makes an original contribution to the understanding of Miranda vocabulary that is often infused with abstruse words and legalistic terms. It provides the first analysis of sentence complexity, which affects both Miranda comprehension and retention. As a result of these analyses, preliminary guidelines are provided for increasing the comprehension and understanding of Miranda warnings.     

Government Communications,Political Trust and Compliant Social Behaviour: The Politics of Covid-19 in Britain

It is commonly said that the lockdowns and social distancing necessary to control coronavirus pandemics will only work if the general population trusts its government, believes the information it provides, and has confidence in its policies. This article traces the British government’s record in providing information about its policies and performance, and compares this with the public’s use of the mainstream news media. It then considers how these two sources of information affected trust in government and public compliance with social distancing and lockdown rules. Lastly, it compares Covid-19 with Brexit and draws conclusions about how beliefs and behaviour are formed when individuals are personally faced with a serious threat.     

Power through trade: opportunities and constraints of the European Union’s norm entrepreneurship—the case of Hong Kong

Asia Europe Journal - The economic, trade, and cultural relations between the European Union (EU) and Hong Kong are widely recognized in the existing literature to be the most beneficial and...     

Being Ms B: B, autonomy and the nature of legal regulation

In this article, we question the apparent simplicity of medical law's construction of 'life and death' cases as a clash between the sanctity of life principle and patient autonomy. Our main purpose in doing so is to try to understand more fully the nature of law's regulation of the existence and non-existence of life. Specifically, we argue that, by broadening the understanding of autonomy in this area beyond a simple concern for patients' rights and self-determination, to include a focus on the individual generally, it becomes possible to identify some of the legal practices that are central to the manner in which law regulates the threshold between life and death. Through an analysis of a recent case in English law--Re B (an adult: refusal of medical treatment)--(although Australian jurisdictions presently disclose no similar, authoritative case, ours presently is almost an arbitrary choice)--we demonstrate the central role played in this regulation by tests for mental capacity, questions of character, explanation, and imagination. We conclude that medical law, at least in this context, can be theorised as a normalising practice--one in which the determination of norms often occurs through patients.