Interstate Competition and Welfare Policy

In 1996, the federal government terminated the Aid to Familieswith Dependent Children (AFDC) program and replaced it withthe Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF).Many powers once held by the federal government are now beingused by state governments. Will welfare assistance be redesignedand expanded or will states "race to the bottom?" This issueis investigated by examining state welfare policy choices duringthe latter years of AFDC(1976–1994). Because each stateunder AFDC had the authority to set the level of its welfareguarantee for families that had no income, it is possible toestimate the effects of interstate competition on AFDC guaranteelevels. By estimating a spatial autocorrelation coefficientwhile controlling for theoretically relevant variables and statefixed effects, this study finds evidence that states are sensitiveto the welfare policies of their competitors.     

Ethics and the unintended consequences of social research: A perspective from the sociology of science

It is argued that successful social science requires the development of a social ethic or sense of research responsibility. An examination of impediments to ethical reflection in sociology suggests that an individualistic orientation is ineffective in coping with the unintended consequences of social research. Such consequences can be particularly harmful in the sociology of science where policy research and governmental support for its production often entails an indiscriminate advocacy of knowledge. Such advocacy raises anew questions of the power of scientific knowledge, the definition of client-professional relationships, and the collection of data which may not only violate the intent of individuals and groups supplying information, but may undermine the credibility of sociology itself.An early version of this paper was presented at the Sixth Annual Alpha Kappa Delta Sociological Research Symposium, Richmond, Virginia, February 19–21, 1976.     

Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production

A central question in the international and comparative political economy literatures on globalization is whether economic integration increases worker insecurity in advanced economies. Previous research has focused on the role of international trade and has failed to produce convincing evidence that such a link exists. In this article, we argue that globalization increases worker insecurity, but that foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs) is the key aspect of integration generating risk. FDI by MNEs increases firms' elasticity of demand for labor. More-elastic labor demands, in turn, raise the volatility of wages and employment, all of which tends to make workers feel less secure. We present new empirical evidence, based on the analysis of panel data from Great Britain collected from 1991 to 1999, that FDI activity in the industries in which individuals work is positively correlated with individual perceptions of economic insecurity. This correlation holds in analyses accounting for individual-specific effects and a wide variety of control variables.     

Campaign Advertising and Democratic Citizenship

Concern about the state of American democracy is a staple of political science and popular commentary. Critics warn that levels of citizen participation and political knowledge are disturbingly low and that seemingly ubiquitous political advertising is contributing to the problem. We argue that political advertising is rife with both informational and emotional content and actually contributes to a more informed, more engaged, and more participatory citizenry. With detailed advertising data from the 2000 election, we show that exposure to campaign advertising produces citizens who are more interested in the election, have more to say about the candidates, are more familiar with who is running, and ultimately are more likely to vote. Importantly, these effects are concentrated among those citizens who need it most: those with the lowest pre-existing levels of political information.     

Goal Displacement: Assessing the Motivation for Organizational Cheating

A major problem in assessing bureaucratic performance is the difficulty in judging the final social outcomes stemming from the work of public agencies. As a result, public agencies are frequently evaluated based on the outputs they produce. Agency outputs (such as, criminal cases solved, inspections) are easier to measure than the actual contributions agencies make to social outcomes (such as, preventing workplace discrimination, protecting the environment). When agency performance is evaluated in terms of numerical outputs, bureaucrats have an incentive to maximize outputs, regardless of whether maximizing outputs is the preferred strategy for achieving desired social outcomes (a form of goal displacement). This incentive to maximize outputs may lead to organizational cheating, in which public agencies purposely manipulate output levels to portray their work in the best light possible.
This study examines the problems of goal displacement and organizational cheating in Texas public schools. Specifically, we examine the degree to which school districts cheat to manipulate student pass rates on standardized exams. School districts "cheat" by liberally exempting certain students from these exams in hopes of raising overall district pass rates. Scarce institutional resources and extreme task demands are associated with cheating. From a management perspective, this study demonstrates the problems in implementing performance standards. From an academic perspective, it provides the first theory about when and why organizations cheat.