Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information

We develop an empirical estimator directly from an extensive-formcrisis bargaining game with incomplete information and discussits features and limitations. The estimator makes it possibleto draw inferences about states' payoffs from observationaldata on crisis outcomes while remaining faithful to the theorizedstrategic and informational structure. We compare this estimatorto one based on a symmetric information version of the samegame, using the quantal response equilibrium proposed in thiscontext by Signorino (1999, American Political Science Review93:279–298). We then address issues of identificationthat arise in trying to learn about actors' utilities by observingtheir play of a strategic game. In general, a number of identifyingrestrictions are needed in order to pin down the distributionof payoffs and the effects of covariates on those payoffs.     

The Needs and Financial Problems of Small and Rural Localities: The Case of West Virginia

The areas of Public Finance and Financial Management present potential problems for small and rural local governments. Responses from a survey of West Virginia local public officials were used to examine the severity of these two issues. Both issues were thought to be of equal importance Instead, the findings showed that Public Finance issues rated very high while Financial Management issues rated very low. Potential influences, such as type of locality, professionalism, and metropolitan area status, fail to explain the differences. Thus, it is concluded that for small and rural localities, Public Finance issues are more important than Financial Management issues     

Validation of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory for Axis II Disorders: Does It Meet the Daubert Standard?

Law and Human Behavior - Relevant to forensic practice, the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) established the boundaries for the admissibility of scientific...     

TAIWAN AND HONG KONG: CHINA'S POLICIES AND PROSPECTS (Review Article)

The author defines state-building as a process of increasing the capabilities within a society for the benefit of its population, noting that, traditionally, in Afghanistan villages were run through consent, though the state has usually preferred force. He then examines the various factors said to inhibit state-building – geography, class, the warlords, ethnicity and political Islam – drawing relevant comparisons with other South Asian states. His conclusion is that it has indeed been most difficult to try to build a functioning state in Afghanistan, partly because of the war, but partly because force is no substitute for consent.