Talking trash about landfills: Using quantitative scoring schemes in landfill siting processes

Policymakers and the public often turn to scientific experts for help in making decisions about complex policy problems. Such decisions, however, may involve trade‐offs among desired goals and so require considerable technical and political judgment. Typically there is no objectively "best" answer, although some answers may be better than others. We use a case study of a landfill siting process in Orange County, North Carolina, to analyze how quantitative scoring schemes may best be used to facilitate site selection processes. Quantitative scoring schemes, used and interpreted properly, can help policymakers and the public focus their attention on central rather than peripheral issues, and thereby conduct a more informed political debate. For the quantitative scoring scheme to fulfill this role, however, the community must be explicit about how the scoring scheme will be used within the larger decisionmaking framework. Clarifying the power and limitations of quantitative scoring schemes shows promise for facilitating decisionmaking regarding other locally unpopular land use siting processes, as well as any public policy decision involving multiple objectives. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Public Value in Politics: A Legislative Budget Office Approach

We use Legislative Budget Offices (LBOs) as both a lens and a test of “public value in politics,” a facet of Moore’s original framework that remains its most contested. We identify two public value roles for LBOs: (1) as a normative-advisory institution, and (2) as a mechanistic-costing one. Through Moore’s Strategic Triangle, we contrast the higher public value contribution of the advisory role, as manifested in the United States, with the costings role as manifested in Canada. Our findings suggest that LBOs enhance both democracy and efficiency and thus show how “public value in politics” can be achieved.     

Policy Attitudes in Institutional Context: Rules,Uncertainty, and the Mass Politics of Public Investment

This article examines the link between citizens’ policy attitudes and the institutional context in which policies are carried out. The article develops a theory of opinion formation toward policies that impose costs on citizens in order to invest in broadly valued social goods. In this framework, problems of agency loss and time inconsistency leave citizens uncertain about whether promised policy benefits will be delivered. Citizen support for public investments thus depends on whether the institutional context makes elites’ policy promises credible. We consider hypotheses about how the institutional allocation of authority and the institutional rules governing implementation affect citizen support for public investment, and we find broad support for the framework in three survey experiments administered to representative samples of U.S. citizens. The results shed light on the link between political institutions and citizens’ attitudes, the capacities of voters for substantive political reasoning, and the political prospects for public investment.     

Examinations as Cultural Capital for the Victorian Schoolgirl: ‘thinking’ with Bourdieu

By focusing on the second half of the nineteenth century, the article will demonstrate that girls’ success in public examinations has a long history. It will highlight that opportunities for girls to take such examinations were limited by Victorian perceptions of what might be acceptable for their gender and, more especially, by their social class. The data presented in the article is analysed using a Bourdieusian framework.     

The progress of the betting in a baseball game

The development of the Internet has led to the creation of countless new markets, among them, online, in-game betting markets for sporting contests. We examine the behavior of prices as events unfold in a baseball game. Specifically, we compare the evolution of prices during a game with probability estimates generated by an empirical model of scoring in baseball. We find that price changes correspond closely to changes in the probability of winning, for plays of both small and dramatic impact. Nevertheless, data limitations inhibit the ability to make strong claims regarding the hypothesis of efficient pricing.     

Developing an index of EX-POST parliamentary oversight of public finance

For the past decade, scholars and practitioners have developed indexes to measure both legislative powers in general, and of the legislative power of the purse, in particular. Initial focus was on the development of a comprehensive index of legislative powers, and on assessing the ex-ante role of the legislature in the budget process.

This article substantially deepens extends previous research on ex-post oversight, by developing a more comprehensive index to measure ex-post oversight, by using more up-to-date data bases and by including more countries. We can partially confirm the emerging consensus that ex-post budget oversight is stronger in parliamentary – and especially Westminster – systems than in countries with other forms of government, thereby somewhat offsetting the previously identified weaknesses of Westminster parliaments in budget formulation.

When used in combination Wehner’s [2006. Assessing the power of the purse: An index of legislative budget institutions. Political Studies, 54, 767–785] index of ex-ante legislative oversight, this index provides a comprehensive picture of legislative power of the purse regarding the budget process.     

The European Commission and fiscal governance reform: a strategic actor?

The intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe has added a new impetus to the debate over the possibilities for securing supranational fiscal integration within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Since the literature on the European Union’s response to the crisis is dominated by the study of intergovernmental politics, this article considers the previously neglected role of the Commission. A framing analysis of the Commission’s crisis discourse is operationalised here, which is supplemented by interviews with senior officials located in the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) during key phases of the crisis. It is found that a supranational reform agenda was never internalised by the Commission. Instead, the Commission acted strategically by framing the crisis around intergovernmental fiscal discipline. These findings suggest that, in line with the ‘new intergovernmentalist’ thesis, supranational institutions themselves may not be as ‘hard-wired’ towards supranationalism as is often assumed.