How do college students in Ukraine and the United States view criminal offenders?

This paper introduces an original data set that provides insight into how Ukrainian and US college students would punish criminal offenders. Students on four campuses in Ukraine and four in the United States completed surveys that help us better understand these differences. In general, Ukrainian students are more likely than American students to be crime victims than are American students and they are consistently more fearful of being victimised. Ukrainian students are more punitive than American students for some types of crimes (e.g., drug possession) while Americans are more punitive on other crimes (e.g., burglary).     

Understanding America's Hesitant Steps Toward Financial Capitalism: Politics, the Depression, and the Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking

Few would disagree that the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 is thecontinental divide in American financial and banking history. Bydisallowing banks from getting involved in the investment bankingindustry, this Act imposed an institutional change that shaped howfinancial institutions conduct their business, even today in itsdecline. Conventional wisdom has it that the Act was enacted tocorrect the ``deficient'' financial system that existed during theperiod. In this paper we investigate whether this assertion can beempirically verified by analyzing the Senate vote on a predecessorof this Act (which included the clause separating commercialbanking from investment banking activities). Using multinomiallogits, we examine what may have motivated senators to vote for itspassage. The econometric evidence indicates that the Senate votewas significantly influenced by important interest groups(including national banks as well as manufacturing sectorinterests), despite the large populist outcry for financial marketreforms at the onset of the Depression.     

The Limits of External Empowerment: EMU, Technocracy and Reform of the Greek Pension System

This paper seeks to explain an aborted attempt at reform of the Greek pension system, following a series of previous failures. It applies the framework of rational choice institutionalism in order to examine the strategy and setting of the relevant actors. The pension system had become a huge fiscal burden on the state, threatening Greece's position in the European Union. Moreover, its gross inequalities of provision and bureaucratic inefficiency were symptoms of the embedded clientelism and 'disjointed corporatism' that stood in the way of the government's self-proclaimed 'modernization' programme. In the event, though EMU entry requirements empowered the reform momentum, a combination of the strategic weakness of key actors and the entrenched opposition of sectoral interests dissipated the initiative. The failure suggests the relevance of the wider social setting to reform: in particular, the weakness of the technocratic community and the relative absence of a supportive 'advocacy coalition', beyond the dominance of the 'party state'. Faced with criticism, the political leadership sought to protect their electoral position and postponed pressing decisions. The case study raises important questions about the scope for such reform in Greece and the future stability of the 'Euro-zone'.     

Clubs and the Cost of Agency

The paper investigates the impact of agency costs on clubmembership. Using a simple principal-agent model, under standardassumptions, the paper demonstrates that increased agency costsassociated with hidden action can lead to an expansionary bias.     

The emergence of a fourth pillar in development aid

Development co-operation has traditionally been the playing field of governments, multilateral institutions, and established development NGOs. In the past decade, however, other actors in Northern countries (such as businesses, migrants' organisations, professional groups, and schools) have shown active interest in development-related activities. Although they do not belong to the epistemic community of development specialists and are often overlooked in the discourse and literature on development co-operation, their number and importance are growing. These novel approaches to development co-operation give rise to some important reflections about their methodologies, potential impact, and fundraising. Based on the authors' experiences and research in Belgium, the article raises some issues about what they term the fourth pillar of development co-operation, with the aim of stimulating the academic and policy-oriented debate.     

Does inconvenience explain low take‐up? Evidence from unemployment insurance

Application inconvenience is one popular explanation for why many individuals do not receive the social benefits for which they are eligible. Applications take time and some individuals may decide that the financial benefits do not outweigh these time costs. This paper investigates this explanation using cross‐state variation in administrative changes that made applying for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits substantially more convenient over the past decade. We find that the introduction of phone‐ and Internet‐based claiming did not have an appreciable impact on overall UI take‐up, nor did it lead to a shift toward recipients that are higher income or likely to be receiving the maximum benefit amount. These findings are inconsistent with a time‐ and transaction‐cost explanation for low take‐up, since remote UI claiming is less time intensive. This suggests that reducing application barriers alone may not be an effective tool for increasing program participation. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.