Digging Up, Dismantling, and Redesigning the Criminal Law

The criminal law raises wonderfully thorny foundational questions. Some of these questions are conceptual: What is a plausible conception of crime? What is a plausible conception of criminal law? Some of these questions are genealogical: What are the historical and genealogical roots of the criminal law in a particular jurisdiction? Other questions are evaluative: What are the political and moral values on which a given conception of criminal law depends? What kind of rational reconstruction, if any, could the criminal law be given? And, finally, still other questions are exploratory and normative: Should parts of existing criminal law be abandoned? What new topics in criminal law theory need to be addressed in our globalised, technologically savvy world? The contributors to Antony Duff and Stuart P. Green’s collection Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law tackle these questions with zeal and independent spirit. They disagree markedly with each other about what the foundational questions are. And, they disagree about how those questions should be handled. This article charts their disagreements by situating the contributors within two taxonomies. The first groups them according to their approaches to the foundational questions; the second groups them according to their modes of theorising. This double taxonomy provides a useful frame within which to analyse these competing takes on the philosophically foundational work of criminal law theory.     

Motivated to Adapt? The Role of Public Service Motivation as Employees Face Organizational Change

Researchers concerned with organizational change have consistently emphasized the role that the work environment plays in employee acceptance of change. Underexamined in the public management literature, however, is the role that employee values, particularly public service motivation (PSM), may play in employee acceptance of change. Some scholars have noted a positive correlation between employee PSM and organizational change efforts; this article extends this work by attempting to isolate the mechanisms that explain this relationship. Using data from a survey of employees in a city undergoing a reorganization and reduction in workforce, the authors find that only employees who scored high on a single dimension of PSM—self‐sacrifice—were more likely than others to support organizational change. Rather than support changes for their potential to improve public service, this finding suggests that employees with higher PSM may simply be less likely to resist changes that might disadvantage them personally.     

…And yet they persist: Explaining survival and transition in neopatrimonial regimes

Although the literature on transitions from neopatrimonial regimes provides many accounts of chaotic breakdown, it seldom explains why some personalistic regimes survive the kinds of intense domestic crises that topple similar systems. This article introduces cases of regime restabilization to a previous analysis of change, showing that while patrimonial authority often isolates leaders and provokes unrest, extensive patrimonial ties can help the regime endure these same challenges and defeat its domestic foes. Specifically, when their repressive capacity is not inhibited by foreign powers during crises, neopatrimonial leaders can withstand insurgencies and prevent regime change. Building upon Richard Snyder's study of neopatrimonial transitions, I explore this argument through a variable of “hard-liner” strength derived from the regime's domestic patrimonial networks and its relationship to a foreign patron. Adding four original case studies of enduring neopatrimonialism (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia) to Snyder’s prior work, I find the revised voluntarist framework explains both transition and restabilization in a composite set of fifteen cases. Jason Brownlee is a Ph.D. candidate in the Politics Department of Princeton, University. His dissertation examines the causes of regime change and stability in electoral authoritarian systems. For constructive feedback on earlier versions of this article, I thank Michele Penner Angrist, Nancy Bermeo, Mac Brownlee, Ellis Goldberg Fred Greenstein, Atul, Kohli, James Mahoney, Dan Slater, Richard Snyder, David Waldner, the participants of the Comparative Politics Research Seminar at Princeton University, and two anonymous reviewers.     

Justifying Punishment: A Response to Douglas Husak

In ‘Why Criminal Law: A Question of Content?’, Douglas Husak argues that an analysis of the justifiability of the criminal law depends upon an analysis of the justifiability of state punishment. According to Husak, an adequate justification of state punishment both must show why the state is permitted to infringe valuable rights such as the right not to be punished and must respond to two distinct groups of persons who may demand a justification for the imposition of punishment, namely, individuals subjected to punishment and the society asked to support the institution of punishment. In this discussion, I analyse Husak’s account of the right not to be punished with an eye to showing that the parameters of that right do not extend to the cases that would make it controversial. I also consider two other distinct groups of persons who have equal standing to alleged offenders and society to demand justification for the imposition of state punishment, namely, direct victims of crimes and criminal justice officials.