Conclusion The standard literature on implementation offers a number of variables usually associated with successful policy-making.50 Roughly, the variables can be sorted into three broad categories: the nature of the problem to be solved, the causal theory
for problem solution embodied in the statute, and the execution of that statutory solution in practice. These categories will
supply a framework helpful in highlighting the empirical similarities across the cases of oblique funding denial discussed
above and also for revealing important differences. The similarities will show both the conditions which lead to the use of
this particular policy device and the manner of its use; the differences will show the conditions under which it can be used
most effectively. Discussion will then turn somewhat more theoretical, inquiring into the legitimacy of funding denial as
a political means and the capacity of the state apparatus that employs it.
First, the specific social problem addressed in each of the cases of funding denial was relatively intractable. Each involved
a matter of moral purpose - how fast is it safe for one to drive? At what age is one responsible enough to drink? What is
the extent of one's military obligation? What is meant by the principle of equal respect for all individuals? American government
is naturally reluctant to confront such difficult moral decisions and to impose an authoritative determination upon its citizenry.
Not surprisingly, therefore, each case of funding denial was the product of a perceived national emergency, accompanied by
a dramatic mobilization of public opinion - the energy crisis of 1973; the campaign against drunk driving led by MADD; the
sudden presumption of military inadequacy; the civil rights movement, especially the Birmingham marches. The widespread belief
that something must be done gave to politicians the incentive to enact policies placing concentrated costs upon some particular
population group as a prerequisite for achieving diffuse societal ends. Strong ideological justification remained essential
even after initial threshold barriers were overcome. In the speed limit case, for instance, the necessary shift in rationale
from energy conservation to traffic safety somewhat weakened the defense for concentrated costs and left the legislation much
more vulnerable to challenge and exemption.
American politics might well exhibit a general propensity toward particularistic preferences and so-called distributional
policies, which award concentrated group benefits and impose diffuse social costs, but there do regularly exist circumstances
that help enact policies embodying the exact opposite pattern. A further problem exists, however, when designing a feasible
strategy for implementation. In each of the cases considered above, funding denial was adopted because of the perceived insufficiency
of the normal, judicial means of coercive implementation - a legislated national 55 M.P.H. speed limit or a direct prohibition
against interstate alcohol sales to individuals younger than 21 years old would mandate a significant federal police role
and might burden the federal courts; prosecutions under the 1980 Selective Service Act and litigation under the 1954 Brown decision had been deemed incapable of forcing adequate levels of compliance. The alternative next proposed was cash incentives,
making it lucrative for the designated actors to adapt their behavior. But, it was found, the political price of Southern
school desegregation was not sufficiently counterbalanced by the promise of federally funded technical assistance; the prospect
of increased highway aid funds was not enough to induce states to alter their drinking laws. It was then logical for lawmakers
to turn to the disincentive power of financial sanctions.
Oblique funding denial offered a simple and quite attractive theory of policy cause and effect: by threatening to withhold
money from tangentially related concentrated benefits, the target population would be impelled to accept the entailed concentrated
costs of social reform. In the two examples using highway funds, the states as intermediaries were constrained to impose policy
costs upon certain of their citizens or else face penalties themselves. In the two other examples, the impulsion was applied
to the targeted individuals or institutions directly. As a causal theory for solution, however, the funding denial strategy
has its own inherent weakness. In all the cases considered, the population designated for enforcement was not the same as
the total population whose compliance was needed in order to achieve the social end. For example, the Solomon amendment affected
only non-registrant college student aid recipients, a distinct subset of draft law violators. Moreover, all college aid recipients,
even if not formally eligible for the draft, were made subject to penalties if they did not sign the specified form. The provision
was on one dimension too narrow and on another much too broad, leading to claims of unfair treatment. Similarly, the 21-year-old
drinking age affected only a portion of adults who might drink and drive, yet it imposed sweeping limits on all members of
a specific age group regardless whether they were drivers or not. The civil rights regulations were applied with inequitable
narrowness, for Title VI enforcement affected only the institutions and programs supported by federal grants, and affirmative
action under Executive Order 11246 was required only of federal contractors. The 55 M.P.H. speed limit, by contrast, was initially
applied with inequitable breadth, uniformly restricting highway speeds irrespective of the type of terrain, the quality of
the road or its safety record.
Supporters of these provisions often justified them in terms of mere expediency. Chief Justice Burger's defense of the Solomon
amendment, that funding denial was a rational tool to encourage compliance among a major group of lawbreakers, was basically
the same as the one employed by civil rights advocates on behalf of Title VI. Expediency, nevertheless, is political as well
as merely technical. Those who were targeted for the funding denial strategy not only exhibited a certain dependence upon
government finance, they also tended to be politically weak. Youths, for example, have been subjected to the strategy both
as students and as drivers. This political weakness was further exaggerated by the stigmatization of the victim. Teenage drivers,
it was implied, were uniquely irresponsible; college students were unpatriotic; and Southern aid recipients lacked a fundamental
respect for the constitution. The exception to the rule was interstate trucking, and thus it is not unexpected that truckers
did win some relaxation in the speed limit when first proposed in 1973, and that the portion of the highway regulations that
most affect them have recently proved susceptible to attack. Finally, turning to practical execution, it is obvious that federal
administrators tend not to want to impose funding sanctions. In all the cases examined, the express legislative intent was
to encourage increased voluntary compliance, and ample provision was always made to allow the violator to correct his behavior
or to negotiate a compromise in good faith. Moreover, federal grant agencies see their primary function as that of giving
away authorized money. Exogenous conditions placed upon the use of such money involved an uncomfortable and often unwanted
conflict among agency priorities. The exercise of funding denial interferes with laudable program operations and risks jeopardizing
relations with Congress and clients. Counterveiling pressures for vigorous action, from social movements or presidential initiative,
have proved fleeting. Thus the actual withholding of authorized dollars has been usually considered somewhat drastic action,
to be reserved for dire situations. The Transportation Department, for example, has not yet deducted the required share from
state highway funds for violations of the 55 M.P.H. speed limit, despite the findings of an administrative law judge and a
suit in federal court to force it to do so. The education division of HEW had a short period of remarkable enforcement activism
during the late 1960s but suffered severely for it, and no other agency has been as aggressive in pursuing civil rights.
Of course, program effectiveness should not be judged solely by the number of sanctions imposed. The declaration made by the
law itself, supported by the threat of possible punishment, can sometimes be sufficient. On the other hand, excessively protracted
negotiations and a clear reluctance to apply funding penalties can give credence to the excuses of violators and effectively
undermine the incentive for recipients to obey. As V.O. Key observed regarding the funding weapon, The mere existence of the
power may have considerable effect, but these indirect results are not so great if the power is not used now and then to give
substance to the threats of its use. When conditions appearing to warrant discontinuance of grants are tolerated, the implied
threat of federal withdrawal ceases to have potency'.51 It also should be noted that the standard for judging what constitutes satisfactory performance is not entirely fixed. Only
half of the drivers must obey the maximum speed limit for a state to retain its full allocation. Draft registration compliance
in the 90% range, monitored by self-certification by college aid recipients, has been considered a success. A similar standard
for affirmative action by federal contractors would generate a storm of criticism. Therefore, it appears, funding denial is
a potentially powerful weapon in the government arsenal that generally has been applied to relatively intractable problems
but in an uneven causal manner by somewhat reluctant administrative agents. The examples discussed above, however, do permit
some differentiation. The intractability of the problem addressed varied with the resolve of the target group and the extent
of behavioral change required. The difficulties of practical execution varied with the leverage available to the government
and the attitude of administrative superiors. On both dimensions, civil rights presented the greatest challenge. Finally,
the causal construction of the statute, itself, varied in ways that affected its ability to overcome barriers to successful
implementation. The funding denial instrument was sometimes linked to explicitly specified compliance standards and time horizons
for their achievement. In those cases, there was least ambiguity regarding the expected behavior of the target group, and
least opportunity for administrative footdragging or political veto. The drinking age and draft registration stipulations
were presented as simple, dichotomous matters of yes-or-no; either the states passed the requisite law and the students signed
the required form, or else they were automatically subject to penalties. The highway speed limit started as dichotomous, but
when a number of states complied formally while intentionally promoting circumvention, the law was altered so as to impose
partial penalties contingent upon more detailed performance criteria. With civil rights, however, the statute neither defined
illegal discrimination, nor established performance standards to be met, nor dictated a timetable for acceptable progress.
Thus it gave to executive agencies an enormous amount of independent discretion. The tempting conclusion is that the funding
denial device should always be used with tight compliance standards and unavoidable violator consequences. This is not quite
true. There can be situations in which the extent of the entailed behavioral change and the sensitivity of the issue require
a more subtle approach. There can be situations in which the strictest enforcement rules will engender a legislative reaction
sufficient to win repeal once popular momentum wanes, and situations in which implementation at less than full enforcement
will nevertheless bring a policy response deemed adequate by the initial intention. Although the bias should be towards specificity,
especially given the lamentable record for Title VI, the optimal strategy must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
The critical question, however, is not whether the funding denial instrument can be used more effectively, but whether it
legitimately can be used at all. There is a sense of impropriety linked to the implicit assertion that the federal government's
promises can be later revised through the attachment of technically unrelated performance criteria, and of arbitrariness in
the exact nature of the contingencies attached. Critics have regularly protested that funding denial rests upon the unfair
strategy of ‘bait-and-switch’, and have claimed that it establishes precedent for the limitless exercise of federal power.
On the other hand, it has proven a useful instrument for social policy implementation in cases where more conventional methods
have failed. Critics have charged that funding denial is discriminatory in practice, applying only to the vulnerable, politically
and by their strong dependence upon government aid. On the other hand, it is a potentially effective means by which at least
certain groups can be induced to act in a manner appropriate for the achievement of a desirable diffuse social good, and half
a loaf is often preferable to none at all. Critics have asserted that funding denial infringes upon traditional prerogatives
and individual freedoms, permitting the aggrandizement of federal authority through devious means. On the other hand, it is
quite normal within budget politics for the recipient of government money to aggressively seek maximum discretion over its
use, and for the grantor of that money to impose constraints in the pursuit of the public interest. It would seem that support
for the oblique funding technique depends largely upon one's view of the diffuse social good pursued. Liberals and conservatives
alike, although for different policy ends, have found it a useful instrument in the federal repertory. The more important
the end and the greater the demand to achieve it, the less American legislators appear to be deterred by the device's potential
limitations.
Nevertheless, something more systematic can be said. American statebuilders have always sought to construct institutional
forms sufficient to the policy task yet with recognition of the abiding national fear of bureaucratic authority and the preference
for private organization and community government.52 American liberal ideology posits a state apparatus imbued with a monopoly of legitimate force which nevertheless exists to
serve private interests without dominating them. Capitalist economics and constitutional rights establish relatively protected
spheres for independent behavior. The state, even when acting on behalf of a clear social good, is simultaneously committed
to maintaining a balance with civil society, which inherently limits its dominion and reduces its policy-making capacity.
Turning specifically to budgetary instruments, the growth in federal spending over the 20th century is usually taken as an
indicator of the increase in central government power. A larger budget implies control over a greater percentage of social
resources, extracting more funds from primary earners in the marketplace and reallocating them to serve publicly determined
ends. That power, however, is far from absolute. The American state is dependent upon a flourishing private sector for the
revenues it expends, and is dependent upon cooperative private actors for the policies implemented through the budget to have
their desired effects. Government, in essence, manipulates money that it directly controls in order to influence behavior
over which it lacks direct control.
This is the wellspring of the ambivalence intrinsic to oblique funding denial. The device is used when lesser means are deemed
insufficient, for they would not induce societal actors to bear the concentrated costs of social reform, but when stronger
ones would invade traditional state government preserves or require a considerable expansion of judicial power. Coercion is
the expected means when government seeks to implement policy ends over an unwilling population. However, in many policy areas,
the federal government is relatively weak in its ability to apply coercion and is often averse to the very notion. The American
commitment to constitutional federalism and to individual rights significantly circumscribes the power of central dictation.
Self-restricted by the rules of its own political system, the federal government must, if it wishes to be effective, then
turn to somewhat novel and incomplete instruments. As a policy instrument, funding denial rejects the subservience of pure
incentives, placing the burden of proof on potential recipients to show that they have fulfilled stipulated requirements and
thus are deserving of funds. Yet denial also suffers strict limitations, as it is constrained by the populations that are
susceptible to its leverage and by the extent sanctions actually can be applied. The consequence is a policy dynamic in which
the federal government seeks to exercise the greatest possible influence consistent with the structured separation of state
from society and of central from local government; and in which the subject group seeks to preserve the greatest possible
freedom of choice consistent with support for the federal government's diffuse social policy goal. The dynamic, which engenders
intense political controversy and gives rise to dramatic rhetoric, must not be thought the product of faulty policy design.
Rather, it is inherent to the logic of an implementation means founded upon the attempt to achieve a complicated philosophical
straddle.
Ultimately, the American public has but three basic choices. It can revise its political system to greatly expand the power
of the federal government. It can abandon the effort to achieve broad social goods when societal interests and local officials
maintain sufficient autonomy to resist. Or it can continue to experiment with the awkward instruments of central government
leverage. With full recognition of the dangers of abuse and of discrimination, and with full awareness that the results will
be less than ideal, social reformers must consciously work to expand the middle ground. Public policy is not just the product
of state-and-society relationships. It also reflects the form of those relationships. Ironically, oblique funding denial,
for all the appearance of imperious power, is an expression of the institutional tensions fundamental to a liberal political
regime. It is a natural consequence of the distinction between central state superintendence but private and local responsibility
that is so heralded in American ideology. Funding denial, a complex federal policy instrument which simultaneously leads opponents
to claim arbitrary manipulation and supporters to doubt enforcement adequacy, must therefore be seen as a systematic product
of the society that invented it.
with the assistance of David M. Dudar 相似文献
Is Public Administration (PA) as a field of study a basic science? If not, could PA generally and Chinese PA (CPA) in particular become a basic science or a design science? To address these questions, this essay reviews pertinent literature to underscore the major problems, basic deficiencies, and critical issues of CPA, and then reviews ongoing CPA research to shed light on its future development. Our review shows that PA lacks an intellectual core that defines the nature of public administration as a professional practice, and in turn, the nature of PA as an academic discipline. Further, while CPA bears the same deficiencies, it also suffers from three maladies, namely, reductionism, traditionalism, and conservatism, which together reinforce mediocrity. In view of all these issues and problems, where CPA is headed? Our literature review reports some ongoing research breakthroughs in CPA, including ontological confirmation of public administration nature and identification of necessary conditions for effective administrative results, which form a basis to suggest that CPA may become a basic science and design science.
Given the unprecedented scale of intergovernmental development funding and the importance of institutional quality for human well‐being, it is imperative to precisely understand the impact of development funds on corruption. In Europe, European Union (EU) Funds provide a boost to public spending in recipient member states while introducing additional corruption controls. We investigate whether EU Funds increase high‐level corruption in the Czech Republic and Hungary in 2009–2012. We analyze newly collected data from over 100,000 public procurement contracts to develop objective corruption risk indicators and link them to agency level data in the public sector. Propensity score matching estimations suggest that EU funds increase corruption risk by up to 34 percent. The negative effects are largely attributable to overly formalistic compliance and EU Funds overriding domestic accountability mechanisms in public organizations entirely dependent on external funds. The policy implications are profound: governments should reduce barriers to market entry by lowering red tape and prevent excessive concentration of funds. 相似文献