Intra-European Bargaining and the ‘Tower of Babel’ EU Approach to the Burmese Conundrum

Since the 1990 imposition of an arms embargo, the European Union has kept on furthering its sanction policies towards Burma’s military regime in response to its poor record on human rights and authoritarian rule over the country. However, more than a decade after the 1996 EU Common Position on Burma, the European approach to the Burmese conundrum has still failed to achieve its initial objective of facilitating a transition to democracy and of stimulating aid and development in the country. This article seeks to underline the limits of the EU position by highlighting the internal and external obstacles the Europeans have been facing in their policymaking process towards Burma. It is argued that the varied and multiple interests of the 27 EU members; an influential European public opinion favouring an attitude of ostracism; and misunderstandings or miscalculations in appreciating the current state of Burmese affairs have hindered the EU from playing an efficacious role. Moreover these factors also impede its reappraisal.     

The effects of treaty legality and domestic institutional hurdles on environmental treaty ratification

We study the effects of treaty design and domestic institutional hurdles on the ratification behavior of states with respect to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Specifically, we examine whether (1) strong legality mandated by a treaty such as precisely stated obligations, strong monitoring/enforcement mechanisms, and dispute resolution procedures, and (2) high domestic constitutional hurdles such as requirements for explicit legislative approval deter countries from ratifying a treaty. To test our theoretical claim, we use a new time-series-cross-sectional dataset that includes information on the ratification behavior of 162 countries with respect to 220 MEAs in 1950–2000. We find that treaties that are characterized as ‘hard’ indeed deter ratification. Furthermore, explicit legislative approval requiring supermajority also makes treaty ratification less likely.     

Access to Power Versus Exercise of Power Reconceptualizing the Quality of Democracy in Latin America

Research on comparative democratization has recently expanded its focus to issues of institutional quality: clientelism, corruption, abuse of executive decree authority, and weak checks and balances. However, problems of institutional quality are so different from those involved in regime transitions that it is unproductive to treat them as part of the same macro-process, democratization. Whereas regime transitions are changes in the form of access to power, problems of institutional quality involve the exercise of power. Abuses in the exercise of power affecting institutional quality are best characterized not as indicators of authoritarianism and deficiencies in democratization but as reflecting—in Weberian terms—patrimonialism and failures in bureaucratization. Moreover, struggles over the exercise of power involve causes, mechanisms, and actors that can be quite distinct from those at play in conflicts over access to power. The proposed analytical framework centered on the distinction between access and exercise enhances conceptual clarity and provides a stronger theoretical basis for tackling fundamental questions about politics in Latin America, including the failure of democratization to curb clientelism and foster other improvements of institutional quality, and the prospects of democratic stability under patrimonial administrations.     

Unemployment Risks and the Origins of Unemployment Compensation

This paper focuses on the distribution of sectoral unemployment risks and the role of political regimes in the foundational moments of unemployment compensation. The institutionalization of unemployment compensation is a function of two factors. First, it depends on the distribution of unemployment risks by economic sectors. Second, the effect of risk inequality is conditional upon the political regime type. I employ event history analysis of 144 countries throughout the world for the long historical period from 1880 to 2000. The results show that an overall societal level of unemployment risk and inequality of sectoral unemployment risks in a society are positively associated with the likelihood of the institutionalization of unemployment compensation. In addition, the effect of risk inequality is much higher under democracy than under dictatorship. A broader implication is that the creation of unemployment compensation is not only a function of homogeneous working class power but also a function of working class conflict that stems from the heterogeneity of unemployment risks among workers.     

Möglichkeiten einer Verankerung der energiepolitischen Zielsetzung "Versorgungssicherheit" im österreichischen Elektrizitätsrecht

Zusammenfassung  Die im Nachfolgenden abgedruckte Studie wurde im Auftrag der Bundesarbeitskammer ?sterreich erstellt. Ihr Anliegen ist es, M?glichkeiten einer verst?rkten Verankerung der energiepolitischen Zielsetzung "Versorgungssicherheit" im ?sterreichischen Elektrizit?tsrecht auszuloten. Auf Basis des geltenden gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Rechtsrahmens, werden Spielr?ume, die sich für eine Regelung von Aspekten der Versorgungssicherheit nutzen lassen, ermittelt und entsprechende rechtspolitische Vorschl?ge erarbeitet. Die Studie gliedert sich nach den drei Marktstufen des Elektrizit?tssektors: der Ebene der Erzeugung, des Netzbetriebs und der Lieferung (Versorgung mit Strom). Die Rechtslage, Entscheidungspraxis der Regulierungsbeh?rden, Gerichtsentscheidungen und Literatur sind auf dem Stand April 2008 verarbeitet.     

The coalition of the willing: Effect of country diversity in an environmental treaty game

It is analyzed how size differences among countries affect the benefits from climate coalitions. It is shown that size differences lead to smaller coalitions and greater benefits than coalitions among identical countries. The importance of trigger strategies for supporting cooperative solutions is considered. A real world example, based on the world’s six largest emitters, is used to illustrate the implications of size differences in terms of emissions versus valuations of benefits. Climate coalitions become smaller when ranking in terms of benefits is different from ranking in terms of emissions. Three cases of benefit valuations are considered: benefits equal (i) share in world emissions, (ii) share in world GDP, and (iii) share of world population.