Leviathan resists: the endogenous relationship between privatization and firm performance

Using a panel dataset of privatized cement firms in Turkey, this paper models and finds support for the simultaneous relationship between privatization and firm performance. It is found that favorable short-run performance, weak market potential, higher employment, lower socio-economic development, concentrated voter preferences, and weaker representation of right-wing parties in the firms’ locality delay the timing of privatization. The paper also finds that privatization increases output in the medium-term by reducing the labor stock and promoting the adoption of more advanced technology, such that production shifts from constant to decreasing returns to scale.     

Gender Differences in Political Knowledge: Distinguishing Characteristics-Based and Returns-Based Differences

This study assesses whether gender-based differences in political knowledge primarily result from differences in observable attributes or from differences in returns for otherwise equivalent characteristics. It applies a statistical decomposition methodology to data obtained from the 1992–2004 American National Election Studies. There is a consistent 10-point gender gap in measured political knowledge, of which approximately one-third is due to gender-based differences in the characteristics that predict political knowledge, with the remaining two-thirds due to male–female differences in the returns to these characteristics. The methodology identifies the relative contribution of the predictors of political knowledge to each portion of the gap, and then uses this information to elucidate the underlying sources of the political knowledge gender gap and its prognosis. Education is the characteristic that most clearly enlarges the gap, with men receiving significantly larger returns to political knowledge from education than women. Group membership reduces the gap as women obtain gains in political knowledge from belonging to organizations that do not accrue to men. However, these gains are not sufficient to significantly reduce the gap.

A New Measure of Policy Spending Priorities in the American States

In this paper, we develop and test a general measure of policyexpenditures in the American states. Our approach is to constructa spatial proximity model of yearly state program spending.The empirical analysis reveals that state spending patternsvary along a clear and readily-interpretable unidimensionalcontinuum which differentiates policies that provide particularizedbenefits to needy constituencies from policies that providebroader collective goods. Based upon standard evaluative criteria,the variable created from our model possesses some highly desirablecharacteristics. And, it compares favorably to other measuresof state policy activity. The net result is a yearly score foreach state which summarizes that state's spending across allmajor program areas. More generally, we believe that our variablecan be interpreted as valid and reliable representational measurementof state policy priorities. In this capacity, it could occupyan important position within models of state politics. Author's note: Many colleagues provided useful feedback on earlierversions of this paper. We particularly appreciate the excellentcomments and suggestions from Robert Erikson, Richard Fording,Kim Hill, David Lowery, Andrea McAtee, and George Rabinowitz.We would also like to thank Daniel Lewis and William Myers fortheir assistance with the data collection. The yearly statepolicy priority scores obtained from the unfolding analysis,along with the data used to create the scores, the SAS macroto carry out the unfolding procedure, and all other supplemental materialsare available on the authors’ web sites: http://polisci.msu.edu/jacobyand http://polisci.msu.edu/schneider. All these materials arealso available on the Political Analysis Web site.     

Offsetting Uncertainty: Reassurance with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

Conventional models of bargaining and reassurance under incomplete information assume that actors' behavioral signals are objectively cooperative or noncooperative. Even if actors are uncertain of each other's preferences, they know what types of actions the other will view as cooperative. Yet on many real-world issues, cooperation is subjective, and what constitutes a cooperative action is conditional on the receiver's preferences. We present a formal model showing that in these cases, two-sided incomplete information actually incentivizes honest behavior and facilitates credible signaling. Because uncertain senders do not know whether a particular action will be interpreted as cooperative, they have little incentive to misrepresent, and instead honestly pursue their true goals. Thus, where cooperation is subjective, mutual uncertainty is “offsetting,” such that credible signals allow actors to quickly and accurately update their beliefs. We illustrate this logic through a case study of the Sino–Soviet split, and highlight the model's implications for contemporary U.S.–China relations.     

“He said,she said”: Sexual harassment in the fractured criminal justice work place

This article addresses the critical problem of sexual harassment in criminal justice agencies. The authors assess empirically the incidents of sexual harassment in criminal justice organizations, and discuss why sexual harassment is more prevalent in criminal justice agencies than in other public agencies.     

Editorial

Ohne Zusammenfassung