Assessing organized crime: Provisional situation report on trafficking in contraband cigarettes

This report has a dual purpose. On one hand it aims at providing an assessment of the cigarette black market in Northwest Europe, based on a review of open source data. On the other hand, it serves to tentatively explore the possibilities for a comprehensive and meaningful assessment of the organized crime situation in this particular sector.     

The Solitary Center: the Core Executive in Central and Eastern Europe

This article discusses the coordinative capacity of Centers of Government (COGs) in several Central and Eastern Europe countries. In formal terms, COGs are at the heart of the executive process; but their contribution to coherence in executive policymaking has remained limited. This observation applies both to coordination within the executive, and between the executive and other key participants in the political process. In important respects, the "solitary centers" operate in isolation from their political and institutional environment. In part, this weakness of linkage reflects the particular features of the post-Communist political systems; in part, it can be explained by a lack of nodality, authority and policy expertise at the COG. There are good reasons to assume that, as policy systems mature, problems of linkage will decline in significance. But this outcome cannot be taken for granted. Instead, we might be witnessing the emergence of a "new administrative type" in some Central and Eastern European countries.     

The Donor Problem: An Experimental Analysis of Beneficiary Empowerment

Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. These recipients may, however, withhold complaints to ‘thank’ the intermediary for selecting them. Furthermore, the intermediary may distort selection (for example, by picking richer recipients who feel less entitled) to reduce complaints. We design an experimental game representing the donor's problem. We compare two institutions. In one treatment the intermediary selects recipients. In the other selection is random – as by an uninformed donor. In our data random selection dominates delegation of the selection task to the intermediary. Selection distortions are similar but intermediaries divert more when they have selection power (correctly anticipating that gratitude for selection will reduce complaints). Our results identify a problem in combining selection and delivery tasks. The insights are also applicable to social funds, decentralisation and participatory projects.     

DISARMAMENT AND BIG BUSINESS: THE CASE OF KRUPP, 1918–1925

Well before 1914, the Krupp Steel Foundry in Essen had gained a world-wide reputation as a major producer of heavy weaponry. The disarmament procedures set in train initially by the armistice and thereafter by the Versailles Treaty would, therefore, impact massively on one of Europe's few large-scale steel producers, whether in terms of output or with regard to its influence in German politics. This article analyses such developments during the early 1920s, with special reference to the activities of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IMCC), including their impact on production and on the workforce at the Krupp factories in Essen. It also investigates efforts by Krupp's management (and also German politicians) to evade military restrictions and also to maintain expertise in the production of heavy weaponry.