Flourishing retail in the post-soviet sphere? Potentials and constraints of small-scale retail activities in rural Kyrgyzstan

The demise of the USSR led to the collapse of its centrally organised retail system. With this collapse the supply of consumer goods dried up, especially in the remote parts of the former USSR. At the same time the advent of capitalism offered a new institutional framework for independent retail activities. In the Kyrgyz Republic, where the economic liberalisation followed strictly the Washington Consensus, a large number of small shops emerged in both urban and rural areas. This study analyses the reasons for this boom in retail start-ups as well as the constraints the mainly inexperienced merchants encounter. As will be shown, any success in retail activities depends greatly on the performance of other economic sectors. The main goal of starting a retail business is to minimize risks within the overall livelihood strategies of households in rural Kyrgyzstan.     

Welfare Implications of User Innovation

Innovation by users is now understood to be an important part of innovative activity in the economy. In this paper we explore the implications of adding innovation by users to existing models of social welfare that currently assume innovation by manufacturers only. We find this addition removes several inefficiencies, and that social welfare is likely to be increased by the presence of user innovation. Implications for policies that can impact users' freedom to innovate are discussed.     

Discretion and corruption: The Chilean judiciary

Corruption in the judiciary and its effects on the budget of that branch of government, the efficiency of justice (prompt or belated) and its quality (biased or impartial) are analyzed. The discretionary powers of the Supreme Court and those granted to judges to manage their courts, calendar and case load, and the hierarchical administrative structures of judiciaries, which function as a queueing system, may be used as a tool to maximize graft. These phenomena reveal links between institutional forms and incentives. Using the case of Chile and the exceptional emergence of corruption within the judiciary during the military dictatorship, the role of democracy as a punishing and preventive mechanism is highlighted.This article was written while the author was a Senior Fellow at the Orville Schell, Center for International Human Rights Law at Yale Law School, and under the auspices of the North-South Center of the University of Miami.