Obtaining a loan is an individual’s private business and such a right should be free from interference. However, if Government
officers obtain a loan from undesirable persons, they may be lured into committing an act which they would not otherwise have
done but for the favours having been shown by the lenders. Section 3 of Hong Kong’s Prevention of Bribery Ordinance attempts
to limit such behaviour of Government officers. Since the power of this provision is draconian, it may possibly violate human
rights. This paper attempts to use a Social Censure perspective to explain why this provision was put in place in the 1970s
and why it was not repealed in the 1990s in line with the rise of human rights standards in Hong Kong. It argues that the
then British colonial government used a high-hand legal code to fight against corruption in the civil service to win its legitimacy
in face of the rise of Red China in the 1970s. A review of twenty-one Section 3 cases suggests that most of the loans were
not distributed for mere friendship but involved a wide range of culpability. Thus the coercion generated by Section 3 was
approved by the masses, resulting in the reinforcement of a draconian but efficient legal provision in the service of the
colonial administration. 相似文献
Sequential lineups were offered as an alternative to the traditional simultaneous lineup. Sequential lineups reduce incorrect lineup selections; however, the accompanying loss of correct identifications has resulted in controversy regarding adoption of the technique. We discuss the procedure and research relevant to (1) the pattern of results found using sequential versus simultaneous lineups; (2) reasons (theory) for differences in witness responses; (3) two methodological issues; and (4) implications for policy decisions regarding the adoption of sequential lineups. 相似文献
Regulatory instruments in the form of normative documents has been used as a way to modernize Chinese society since the late 1970s. However, the conflict between laws undermines the effectiveness of such efforts. This article aims to answer the following questions in the process of law-making: How serious is the conflict of normative documents in China? Why there exists the conflict of normative documents? How the Legislation Law approaches the conflict of normative documents? What to be done to prevent the conflict of normative documents? 相似文献
Local policy innovation is considered one of the major drives for China’s rapid economic development, especially during the first 35 years of reform in China. Given the new central policies and constant anti-corruption campaigns under the Xi administration, this article examines a timely question of why and how local officials continue to develop new innovative policies and projects. Based on previous theoretical building, the article analyzes such key institutional factors as new rules of game and their impact on local officials’ competition for survival and career advancement. Selecting cases across all the districts from a typical city in China, this article compares and identifies the changing patterns in local policy innovation. Policy innovations are administrative choices made by local officials in response to new and changing institutional opportunities and constraints. The discussion in this article makes significant contributions both theoretically and empirically to the China studies.