Incumbency Effects under Proportional Representation: Leaders and Backbenchers in the Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies

We study incumbency effects for individual legislators from two political parties (Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party) in Italy's lower house of representatives over 10 legislatures (1948–92) elected using open‐list proportional representation. Our analysis finds no reelection advantage for the average incumbent legislator. Only a tiny elite in each party successfully creates an incumbency advantage. We find incumbents advantaged for reselection by their political party. We interpret reselection advantage as a party loyalty premium. Our study depicts a political environment monopolized by party leaders who reward party loyalty but hamper legislators in appealing directly to voters.     

Chains of Adversity: The Time-Varying Consequences of Paternal Incarceration for Adolescent Behavior

Journal of Quantitative Criminology - I draw on general strain theory, a framework often used to understand adolescent behavior, and augment it with aspects of the stress process perspective to...     

Giving Users A Plain Deal: Contract-Related Media Liability For Unmasking Anonymous Commenters

Could news organizations face civil liability for voluntarily unmasking their anonymous online commenters? This article examines that nascent legal question through a discussion of contract law applied to a study of seven news Web sites’ policies and practices. The study finds that although the news organizations claim that they zealously guard user privacy and will resist unmasking commenters under almost any circumstances, most of them have user agreements that would likely immunize them from civil liability for almost any reason. Are users getting a plain deal?     

Regulating the invisible: interaction between the EU and Norway in managing nano-risks

Over the last decade, the need for governance of human health and environmental safety risks of nanotechnology (NT) has received increased attention at international, national and EU levels. There were early calls for increased funding of independent research, risk analysis and voluntary or mandatory regulation, but currently overall regulatory efforts have not materialised. One possible explanation is that research has revealed little need to regulate environmental and health safety risks of NT. Alternatively, there is a gap between politics and governance and the evolving state of knowledge. Such a gap can be caused by various factors including change in interests, saliency and organisation. Organisational challenges related to the science–policy interface at national, international and the EU can affect how new knowledge is channelled into decision-making processes. Decrease in public saliency is another possibility. Finally, opposition to regulation among affected producers may have increased and in turn stalled regulation through lobbying. The two explanations are analysed in a multi-level governance context. Norway is chosen as an interesting case: Highly profiled as a frontrunner i.a. in regulating gene technology, but currently awaiting regulations in the EU due to the European Economic Area agreement.     

The Shifting Parameters of Nationality

Netherlands International Law Review - This article has two interrelated aims. First, the article goes beyond law and places the discussions on nationality in the broader literature on citizenship,...     

The Surprising Logic of Transparency

The article examines the concept of transparency and its effect on international crises. It tests two possible logics of transparency, one positive and one negative. In the former, transparency is seen as defusing international crises by illuminating other states' peaceful intentions and ameliorating the security dilemma. In the latter, transparency is seen as exacerbating crises by overwhelming diplomatic signals with the noise of domestic politics and confusing opponents about which domestic voices are authoritative expressions of state policy. The authors conclude that, surprisingly, transparency makes conflicts worse more often than not—a conclusion that casts doubt on one possible explanation ofthe democratic peace.