Democratization and Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan

Over the last 20 years, Taiwan has witnessed an impressive transition from authoritarian one-party rule to liberal democracy. This included considerable changes in the relations between the civilian political elites and the armed forces. While under the emergency laws of the authoritarian regime the military had been a powerful political force, during democratization the elected civilians have managed to curb military political power and have successively widened their influence over former exclusively military prerogatives. This article argues that the development of Taiwan's civil–military relations can be explained as the result of civilians using increasingly robust strategies to enhance their influence over the military. This was made possible by a highly beneficial combination of historical conditions and factors inside and outside the military that strengthened the political power of the civilian elites and weakened the military's bargaining power. The article finds that even though partisan exploitation of civilian control instruments could potentially arouse civil–military conflict in the future, civil–military relations in general will most likely remain supportive of the further consolidation of Taiwan's democracy.     

The “dictator’s endgame”: Explaining military behavior in nonviolent anti-incumbent mass protests

This article introduces a configurative theory to explain military reactions to nonviolent mass protests in dictatorships. An empirical analysis of three cases of such “dictators endgames” (Burma in 1988, Sudan in 1985, and East Germany in 1989), shows that militaries will defend the dictator against the masses if the military leadership’s physical and economic well-being is linked to the dictator’s survival in office. In turn, military leaders will defect from the regime incumbent only if the alternatives of siding with the opposition or staging a coup d’état is expected to be more beneficial to their interests than staying loyal to the regime.     

College education,major, or criminology classes? An examination of what drives students’ level of punitiveness

This study examines the level of punitiveness of criminology and criminal justice (CRIM) majors and non-majors. In particular, undergraduate students from a mid-western university situated in a rural area were surveyed to determine if college education, major, or exposure to CRIM classes impacts their punitive attitudes towards offenders. Regression analyses suggest that it is not the number of CRIM classes or the liberalization effect of college but the major that best predicts the level of punitiveness. Results also indicate that predictors of punitiveness differ between CRIM majors and non-CRIM majors. Implications of these findings are discussed.