Notes and comments "High and dry?" The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and liability protection for pharmaceutical manufacturers

In an era filled with fears of bioterrorism, Congress approved the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREPA) to encourage development of vaccines and other countermeasures. By providing pharmaceutical manufacturers with protection from liability for potential side effects, Congress has attempted to motivate manufacturers to produce a national stockpile of countermeasures. As part of PREPA, the government established a compensatory system intended to provide compensation to persons injured by countermeasures used during a public health emergency. Although the Act provides for a compensation fund, it fails to allocate monies for that fund. Thus, in the absence of further congressional action, PREPA will not provide compensation to those injured by countermeasures. Failing to assure the American public of a compensation program constitutes bad public policy and risks inspiring potential vaccinees to refuse necessary drugs. Additionally, arguments as to the constitutionality of the Act exist should Congress fail to adequately fund the program, and the existence of those arguments undermines the purpose of the Act--namely to assure pharmaceutical manufacturers that they will not be sued into oblivion should they attempt to aid national pandemic protection. In addition to detailing both the Act and the statutory precedent for congressional attempts to spur biodefense, this Article addresses important issues of healthcare, tort, and constitutional law that will continue to manifest themselves in this new era of bioterrorism.     

Physician-assisted suicide: legal and ethical considerations

As medicine's technical limits have become increasingly clear, Americans seem more willing to address end-of-life decisionmaking. A major development during the 1990s was physician assistance in dying: physician-assisted suicide in Michigan, Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, and developments in Europe, most notably The Netherlands. This evolution toward recognizing the appropriateness of assistance in dying raises legal and ethical issues for physicians and healthcare institutions such as nursing facilities and acute care hospitals. These issues include the effects on providers' values systems, the trust between patient and provider, and the "slippery slope" that voluntary, active assistance in dying will become involuntary, active assistance. This Article addresses the policy issues that institutions must confront in a changing environment.     

Low Power,First Offers,and Reservation Prices: Weak Negotiators are Self-anchored by Their Own Alternatives

Although most scholars recommend making the first offer in negotiations, recent research and practitioners' experience have uncovered a second-mover advantage in certain situations. In the current article, we explore this first- versus second-mover dynamic by investigating the circumstances under which negotiators would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on the effects of negotiation power in the form of alternatives. Additionally, we examine the effects of low power on reservation prices and whether these effects could be mitigated using an anchor-debiasing technique. In Study 1, we manipulated negotiators' power in the form of the best alternative to the negotiated agreement and examined its effect on first offers and reservation prices. Our results showed that low-power negotiators would receive more favorable first offers than they would have made themselves when facing either low- or medium-power counterparts. Also, our results suggest that low-power negotiators had less favorable reservation prices than their medium- and high- power counterparts. In Study 2, we investigated whether this effect would persist in the face of anchor-debiasing techniques. Our results showed that while anchor-debiasing techniques did improve their first offers, low-power negotiators would still benefit from making the counteroffer rather than moving first. Our findings uncover the disadvantageous effects of low power on first-offer magnitude while offering practical advice to negotiators.