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261.
Drawing on data collected by Barry Latzer and using a logisticregression model that employs pooled time-series, this articletests a variety of factors for their impact on state high courtdecisions to diverge from U.S. Supreme Court criminal proceduredoctrines from 1969 to 1989. Several factors predict the developmentof independent state doctrines protective of civil liberties,including popular-vote retention elections and longer termsof office for state court justices, high court reputations,state wealth, and regional distinctions (with western courtsmost likely to advance individual rights). This study representsonly a small step in understanding an area of judicial behaviorthat has been long ignored in the political science literature. 相似文献
262.
Philip de L. Panet Michael J. Trebilcock 《Canadian public administration. Administration publique du Canada》1998,41(1):21-50
Abstract: Despite the enormous share of social services in government spending and the strong incentives on government to rationalize services, the alternative service delivery (asd) literature has given little attention to social–service delivery. In our paper, we review current approaches taken to social–service delivery in Ontario by the Ministry of Community and Social Services (mcss). Although the mcss retains responsibility for the social–services system, it provides social services almost exclusively through private non–profit agencies under purchase of service contracts. Two themes emerge from our examination of these relationships. First, the standard privatization model has limited application to social–services delivery. Contracts are generally not awarded in a competitive fashion, and contract termination discipline is rarely applied. Given the inadequacies of current performance measures for social services, monitoring contract performance is difficult. Second, the success of attempts to shift provision to private non–governmental entities is intimately linked to the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms, especially outcome–based performance measures. Improving performance measurement is therefore an important priority. In addition to advocating further research into the effectiveness of social services, one interesting mcss initiative has been to look to client communities to help monitor the performance of agencies. We conclude that among the different institutional approaches to social–service delivery, contracting with non–profits is the one that currently seem most appropriate. Sommaire: Malgré la part énorme des dépenses gouvernementales consacrée aux services sociaux et malgré les efforts gouvemementaux pour rationaliser les services, les ouvrages publiés sur la prestation de services par des moyens de rechange n'ont consacré que peu d'attention à la prestation des services sociaux. Nous examinons dam cet article les méthodes adoptées pour la prestation des services sociaux en Ontario par le ministére des Services sociaux et communautaires (mssc). Même s'il retient la responsabilité du réseau des services sociaux, le mssc foumit les services sociaux presque exclusivement par I'intermédiaire d'organismes privés à but non lucratif, en vertu de contrats d'achat de services. En examinant ces rapports, nous en dégageons deux thémes. Premiérement, le modéle de privatisation standard ne s'applique que de maniére limitée à la prestation des services sociaux. Les contrats ne sont généralement pas accordés de maniére concurrentielle, et on n'utilise que rarement la résiliation de contrats en tant que mesure disciplinaire. II est difficile de surveiller la qualité d'exécution des contrats, vu l'insuffisance des mesures de rende–ment actuelles concernant les services sociaux. Deuxièmement, le transfert de I'exé–cution aux organismes privés non gouvernementaux ne peut réussir qu'en présence de mécanismes de responsabilisation adéquats, et en particulier de moyens permet–tant de mesurer le rendement en fonction des résultats obtenus. I1 importe donc d'améliorer les moyens de mesure du rendement. Selon le mssc, en plus des recher–ches suppéementaires concernant l'efficacite des services sociaux, il faut faire appel aux groupes de clients pour aider À surveiller le rendement des organismes. En conclusion, parmi les diverses méthodes institutionnelles de prestation des services sociaux, la sous–traitance faisant appel aux secteurs à but non lucratif semble çtre aujourd'hui la plus appropriwaee. [I]t is no exaggeration to say the state and local governments tend not to know what results their social service contracts are buying. Because competition is low, they have little opportunity to test the market to see what alternatives they have. Few resources are spent to look past what contractors themselves report. The political system has few incentives to dig deeper and many more incentives to maintain the status quo— The problems with oversight underline earlier observations: whatever advantages contracting–out for social services might produce, greater efficiency through market–tested competition is not one of them. State and local governments are engaging in the equivalent of a shopping trip while blindfolded, with little effort spent to squeeze the tomatoes or thump the watermelons 相似文献
263.
264.
Congress confronts two major organizational problems that affect the behavior of legislators, party leaders, and groups doing business with congressional committees: The costly nature of monitoring and the absence of explicit mechanisms for upholding agreements. The problem of monitoring implies that party leaders will have a difficult time influencing decisions made in decision-making arenas where the actions of legislators are less visible, as in congressional committees. While legislators can evade leadership monitoring of their actions within committees, once an issue leaves a committee, the costs of monitoring decline, and leadership influence increases. The absence of mechanisms for assuring that legislators keep their bargains means that groups will place an emphasis on dealing with reliable legislators — those who can be counted upon to uphold their end of a bargain. Thus, party leaders are more effective in influencing floor voting because of their better ability to monitor legislator behavior; however, obligations to important interest groups will be more immune to leadership influence because of the incentives for committee members to adhere to their bargains. 相似文献
265.
James L. Gibson 《Political Behavior》2005,27(4):313-323
The purpose of this article is to reconsider the claim made recently by Mondak and Sanders that political tolerance ought
to be thought to be a dichotomous rather than continuous variable. Using data from both Russia and the United States, I demonstrate
that those Mondak and Sanders regard as uniquely tolerant are most likely no more than people who were given insufficient
opportunity to express their intolerance. Even if such a phenomenon of “absolute tolerance” exists (all ideas expressed in
all ways are to be tolerated), it is sufficiently rare that few practical implications are indicated for those doing empirical
work on political tolerance and intolerance.
* I appreciate the valuable comments of Jeffcry Mondak on an earlier version of this paper. 相似文献
266.
Resource decision making for the Department of Defense (DOD) is one of the most challenging tasks in all of public financial management. DOD coordinates national security threat assessment, long‐ and intermediate‐range planning and programming with annual budget formulation and execution. Between 2001 and 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld changed the system significantly, simplifying, and synchronizing it with presidential terms of office. We assess Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) reform through application of applied budget theory. We review system evolution, document recent reforms, explain why change was necessary, and assess implementation feasibility. Only preliminary evaluation is possible because change implementation will require five or more years. 相似文献
267.
Carol A. L. Prager 《Political studies》2005,53(3):621-640
It is surprising that John Stuart Mill's international thought, which focuses on intervention and empire, has not attracted the attention it warrants. It is particularly surprising that Mill has been largely overlooked by the English School, whose members acutely appreciate the contributions of classical political philosophers to international discourse. Galvanised by his introspection on his life, especially the impact of interference in his psychological and intellectual development, to his analysis of the impact of Britain on India's princely states and intervention in civil wars, Mill identified timeless problems intrinsic to international relations whilst profoundly appreciating the tensions they generated in the form of perverse effects, unintended consequences and moral hazard. Contemporary international relations are replete with examples of the unforeseen and unforeseeable developments that attend intervention and interference. If a concern of the English School is the tormenting decisions that fall to statesmen, Mill provides an understanding of the considerations that vastly complicate such decisions. 相似文献
268.
269.
270.
This paper investigates the impact of fiscal institutions on state government borrowing costs. We find that institutions have both a direct and indirect effect on interest costs paid by state governments. Revenue limits are associated directly with higher interest costs; expenditure limits, stricter balanced budget rules, and restrictions on state debt issuance are indirectly associated with lower interest costs because they lead to higher credit ratings. It appears that investors and bond raters incorporate information on fiscal institutions into their assessment of state government credit quality. 相似文献