On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option

We examine whether nations, faced with the threat of terrorism, will be motivated to engage in the efficient amount of retaliation against terrorists. We demonstrate that the problem confronting the efforts of nations to achieve an optimal retaliation against terrorists is understated by the traditional free-rider analysis. In particular, nations have the option of actually selling or reducing the public good of retaliation, provided through the efforts of others, by offering safe havens to terrorists in return for the terrorists' pledge to attack elsewhere. This paid-rider behavior is also shown to apply to other public good scenarios.The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Gordon Tullock on an earlier draft. Sole responsibility for the paper's content rests with the authors. Todd Sandler's research was supported by a Science and Humanities Research Institute Summer Grant at Iowa State University.     

Teenagers' perception of agreement over family expenditures,employment, and family life

Teenagers' perspective of disagreement over family finances and related factors were investigated. Involvement of teenagers in employment and percentage of earnings kept for personal use were examined. Reasons for employment affected disagreement over finances, whereas family income had no important effect on disagreement over finances in multivariate analysis. Disagreement over finances was important in explaining variation in satisfaction with money management in the family and in satisfaction with family life. Results have implication for reducing stress in family life and for contributing to theory on family resource management and adolescent development.This study is part of an interregional Agricultural Experiment Station Research Project NC-128 Quality of Life as Affected by Area of Residence. Cooperating states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and Texas.Received Ph.D. from Purdue University. Research interests include family economics.Received B.S. from Cornell. Research interests include consumer and family economics.     

The politics of disgruntlement: Nonvoting and defection among supporters of nomination losers, 1968–1984

This paper focuses on the effect of disgruntlement among those primary voters who supported U.S. presidential nomination losers. It analyzes the general election voting behavior of primary voters in the last five presidential elections in order to determine if differences exist between those supporters of the winning nominee in each party and backers of other candidates who also sought the nomination. A multivariate analysis of the determinants of voter turnout shows significant results only for the Democrats in 1972, when primary voters who supported candidates other than George McGovern were more likely to abstain in the general election. Taking into account the option of defecting to another party in November, both parties appear to have been plagued by a considerable amount of disloyalty on the part of supporters of candidates who failed to win the nomination, although for the Republicans this type of response is confined to the 1980 election. The existence of a third party or independent candidacy may be an important variable influencing the behavior of these disgruntled primary voters.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30–September 2, 1984.     

Competitive bidding and states' purchase of services: the case of mental health care in Massachusetts.

Over the past two decades states have significantly increased their use of competitive bidding to purchase health and social services from private agencies. Competitive contracting is thought to facilitate program administration, to reduce costs, and to increase the quality of delivered services. We evaluate these claims in light of Massachusetts' experience with competitive contracting for mental health care. We find that few of the expected benefits are achieved. In practice, supposedly competitive bidding systems often degenerate into administratively complicated negotiations between the state and private monopolies. This results in higher costs and lower quality of services. In light of this negative assessment, three strategies for reform are proposed and evaluated.