Are programme resources related to organizational change?

Abstract. This article joins two public policy approaches often employed separately: the analysis of changes in programme expenditure, and of organizational change. The first section reviews a series of alternative propositions about their relationship: organizations constricting programme innovation, or promoting efficiency or inefficiency; programme changes causing fission or fusion in organizations; increasing programme expenditure by replicating service delivery units rather than re-organization; and the place of symbolic and ad hoc political priorities. After considering problems of analyzing programme and organizational changes empirically, the article examines changes since 1945 in two major policy areas of British government, health and social security, and trade and industry. The empirical evidence emphasizes the dominance of political priorities, symbolic as well as programmatic: the capacity of organizations to grow at the base, by replicating service delivery units while formally remaining unchanged at the top, and of organizations growing at the top, by formal re-organization, while programme budgets and service delivery units are unaffected by symbolic reshuffling.     

Restraining the Governors: The Nordic Experience with Limiting the Strong State

The combination of a tradition of arbitrary royal government and popular intolerance, with the existence of extensive, unitary and highly centralized institutions of government, and with the dominance of government by a single, reformist party for more than a half century would seem a potent recipe for governmental abuse of individual and minority group rights. That is especially true in the absence of the formal constitutional safeguards used to preserve rights elsewhere Yet the Nordic democracies have in fact proved exemplary in protecting civil liberties Why? This article challenges the view that Nordic political societies are consensual historically or by nature, and it describes the limited traditional institutional checks on abuse of individual and minority rights by government Instead it finds the basis for the Nordic democracies' excellent record in civil liberties in the combination of (1) the development of new, non-traditional institutional checks on government. (2) the use of direct democracy as a check on parliamentary majorities. (3) the pervasive use of corporatist channels encompassing the major oppositional interest groups to draft and implement legislation, and (4) the effective constraints placed on decisions by parliamentary majorities by the pattern of fierce partisanship in the finely balanced parliamentary party constellation These protections for individual and minority liberties arise primarily from the assumption that basic conflicts of interest are a fact of political life and that they should be institutionalized.     

THE AMBITIONS OF POLICY DESIGN

There is no shortage of warnings concerning the hazards of excessive ambition in consciously-pursued public policy. In the light of these cautions, this paper considers the appropriate ambitions for policy design. The critics have missed the target. There is no need to fear ambition in policy design, provided that openness in communications about policy is secured.     

State Lotteries for Public Revenue

Lotteries, the state fiscal gimmick of the eighties, operate in jurisdictions encompassing substantially more than half the nation's population and enjoy considerable public acceptance. The revenue they generate is small, rarely more than two percent of state general revenue, it is subject to major year-to-year swings, and it is very expensive to generate, particularly when vendor commissions are recognized as part of cost. Furthermore, lotteries bear a high implicit excise tax rate and, because of the pattern of play across income classes, appears to worsen the overall equity of the revenue system. Their economic impact appears to be that of an internal transfer, although states with major lottery equipment suppliers have most to gain, particularly if they do not operate their own lottery. Lotteries are not destined to become mainstays of government finance, although their spread is likely, even with the fiscal questions they raise.     

Family planning and world health

She is coauthor of the 1987 and 1988 editions of State of the World;and author or coauthor of several Worldwatch papers, including: “Our Demographically Divided World” and “The Future of Urbanization.”     

Expenditures and receipts in state and local government finances: Reply

It is worth repeating that causality testing is a very complex task. The diversity of views on interpreting the definition of causality and on the methods for testing causality highlight this issue. In our study, we cite an excellent article which provides a detailed critique of various problems associated with causality tests (see Conway, et al., 1984). It would appear that Chowdhury's comment draws very strong conclusions and fails to consider some of the complex theoretical issues regarding causality tests as well as important data problems pertaining to state and local governments. Moreover, we find it somewhat curious that, given the strong similarities in our two studies, Chowdhury prefers to dwell on the mechanics of an alternative technique rather than concentrate on the fact that his alternative technique yields supporting results to our 1987 paper on the tax-spend hypothesis.The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Treasury.     

Diffusing information

His many publications include Theories of Mass Communication; Understanding Mass Communication; Milestones in Mass Communication Research;and, with Otto N. Larsen, The Flow of Information.     

Voting for ‘Sin’ in Kansas

We would like to thank our colleagues Nancy Snyder and William Terrell for comments and suggestions. The assistance of Ron Farha and Michael Webb is gratefully acknowledged, as is the patience of the staff in the Elections Office of the Office of the Secretary of State, Topeka, Kansas. Any errors or omissions are, of course, the responsibility of the authors.