DRUG TESTING FOR YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS ON PAROLE: AN EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION*

Research Summary: The present experimental study examined parole outcomes and arrests for 1,958 California Youth Authority parolees, randomly assigned to levels of routine drug testing ranging from “no testing” to two tests per month. Results showed no improved outcomes from more frequent drug testing. Early positive drug tests, however, indicated increased risk of recidivism. Policy Implications: Although limited in its scope, this study provided experimental evidence that little crime‐reduction benefit of routine drug testing above a minimum level exists for regular parolees. However, drug testing may serve as a relatively straightforward risk assessment procedure for future criminal behavior.     

Genetics and Criminal Behavior Evidence Through the End of the 1970s

Research reported up through and including the 1970s directly bearing upon the relationship between genetics and criminality is reviewed. Studies using four classes of research designs are considered: general pedigree (or family) studies, twin studies, karyotype studies, and adoption studies. Only the latter three offer solid evidence at least consistent with a partial genetic etiological hypothesis, and of these, only one type of karyotype study and the adoption studies appear to be on the verge of definitely settling the matter. Among the fairly definitive types of studies, most of the evidence is extremely supportive of the proposition that human variation in tendencies to commit criminal behavior is significantly affected by some genetic factors.     

公用事业特许经营中的临时接管制度研究——从“首例政府临时接管特许经营权案”切入

在公用事业特许经营的实施过程中,当公共利益遭受或面临重大损害时,监管者有权采取临时接管措施来保障公用事业运营的连续性和稳定性。我国公用事业特许经营临时接管制度立法明显滞后,临时接管权的行使隐藏着巨大风险。为了保障临时接管权的正确运用,防止特许经营者的合法权益遭受损害,未来立法应当着重就临时接管的主体、条件、程序、终止等问题做出统一规定。     

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.