The development of drug trade and drug control in the Netherlands: a historical perspective

Drug trade is widely seen as a phenomenon rather new to the Netherlands. However, at the beginning of the 20th century the Dutch pharmaceutical industries were already extensively involved in the production of both opiates and cocaine, and they went on exporting large quantities of these drugs after the Opium Act (1919) took force. Until the 1960s, arrests were not at all common, and these largely affected minority groups like Chinese opium smokers and black marijuana users. Since then, drug control efforts have increased by leaps and bounds. At first, cannabis was the main target; then the focus turned to heroin, and that was later joined by cocaine. This paper traces the history of the drug trade and drug control in the Netherlands, with emphasis on their development in Amsterdam. The conclusion is reached that, in spite of drastic changes in both drug trade and drug control, certain ideologies, constructs and strategies have remained remarkably stable.     

Are there environmental factors influencing the choice of death by drowning as a means of suicide in the Geneva canton?

123 out of 850 suicides that occurred in the Canton of Geneva between 1980 and 1989 were suicides by submersion. 75 women and 48 men committed this kind of suicide. 89 victims (57 women and 32 men) were older than 40 years. In all cases the spatial distance between the residence of the suicides and the nearest river or lake was determined; a correlation with the tendency to commit suicide by drowning was not evident. More than geographical factors, the psychological influences have to be considered.     

Between a rock and a hard place: The Swedish social democratic party into Europe

Goran Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, (Sage, London 1995). 403pp. ISBN 8039 8934 2.

John McGany and Brendan O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, (Blackwell, Oxford 1995). 535pp. ISBN 0–631–18349–3.     

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement.     

Contracting–out social services

Abstract: Despite the enormous share of social services in government spending and the strong incentives on government to rationalize services, the alternative service delivery (asd) literature has given little attention to social–service delivery. In our paper, we review current approaches taken to social–service delivery in Ontario by the Ministry of Community and Social Services (mcss). Although the mcss retains responsibility for the social–services system, it provides social services almost exclusively through private non–profit agencies under purchase of service contracts. Two themes emerge from our examination of these relationships. First, the standard privatization model has limited application to social–services delivery. Contracts are generally not awarded in a competitive fashion, and contract termination discipline is rarely applied. Given the inadequacies of current performance measures for social services, monitoring contract performance is difficult. Second, the success of attempts to shift provision to private non–governmental entities is intimately linked to the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms, especially outcome–based performance measures. Improving performance measurement is therefore an important priority. In addition to advocating further research into the effectiveness of social services, one interesting mcss initiative has been to look to client communities to help monitor the performance of agencies. We conclude that among the different institutional approaches to social–service delivery, contracting with non–profits is the one that currently seem most appropriate. Sommaire: Malgré la part énorme des dépenses gouvernementales consacrée aux services sociaux et malgré les efforts gouvemementaux pour rationaliser les services, les ouvrages publiés sur la prestation de services par des moyens de rechange n'ont consacré que peu d'attention à la prestation des services sociaux. Nous examinons dam cet article les méthodes adoptées pour la prestation des services sociaux en Ontario par le ministére des Services sociaux et communautaires (mssc). Même s'il retient la responsabilité du réseau des services sociaux, le mssc foumit les services sociaux presque exclusivement par I'intermédiaire d'organismes privés à but non lucratif, en vertu de contrats d'achat de services. En examinant ces rapports, nous en dégageons deux thémes. Premiérement, le modéle de privatisation standard ne s'applique que de maniére limitée à la prestation des services sociaux. Les contrats ne sont généralement pas accordés de maniére concurrentielle, et on n'utilise que rarement la résiliation de contrats en tant que mesure disciplinaire. II est difficile de surveiller la qualité d'exécution des contrats, vu l'insuffisance des mesures de rende–ment actuelles concernant les services sociaux. Deuxièmement, le transfert de I'exé–cution aux organismes privés non gouvernementaux ne peut réussir qu'en présence de mécanismes de responsabilisation adéquats, et en particulier de moyens permet–tant de mesurer le rendement en fonction des résultats obtenus. I1 importe donc d'améliorer les moyens de mesure du rendement. Selon le mssc, en plus des recher–ches suppéementaires concernant l'efficacite des services sociaux, il faut faire appel aux groupes de clients pour aider À surveiller le rendement des organismes. En conclusion, parmi les diverses méthodes institutionnelles de prestation des services sociaux, la sous–traitance faisant appel aux secteurs à but non lucratif semble çtre aujourd'hui la plus appropriwaee. [I]t is no exaggeration to say the state and local governments tend not to know what results their social service contracts are buying. Because competition is low, they have little opportunity to test the market to see what alternatives they have. Few resources are spent to look past what contractors themselves report. The political system has few incentives to dig deeper and many more incentives to maintain the status quo— The problems with oversight underline earlier observations: whatever advantages contracting–out for social services might produce, greater efficiency through market–tested competition is not one of them. State and local governments are engaging in the equivalent of a shopping trip while blindfolded, with little effort spent to squeeze the tomatoes or thump the watermelons