FAMILY CARE COMMITMENT DISCRIMINATION: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN WORK AND FAMILY

This Note discusses the pervasive problem of employment discrimination based on family responsibilities, or family care commitment discrimination. Employees with family care commitments often find themselves being pulled in opposing directions—between work and family. When an employee is forced to choose work, for financial reasons, over family, his or her family ends up suffering. The current state and federal statutes aimed at employment discrimination are insufficient to deal with family care commitment discrimination. This Note proposes a change to the current legislation and explains how this change will protect employees and families, while causing employers to internalize externalities by adopting more family‐friendly policies.     

Political Decentralization and Technological Innovation: Testing the Innovative Advantages of Decentralized States

Are politically decentralized states better at fostering long‐run technological innovation than centralized states? Societies with decentralized governments are widely seen as agile, competitive, and well structured to adapt to innovation's gale of creative destruction. Meanwhile, centralized states, even when democratic, have come to be viewed as rigid and thus hostile to the risks, costs, and change associated with new technology, or prone to cling too long to foolhardy or outdated technological projects. Therefore government decentralization is often perceived as a necessary institutional foundation for encouraging long‐run technological innovation. However, in this article, I analyze data on international patent activity, scientific publications, and high‐technology exports, and show that there exists little evidence for an aggregate relationship between government structure and technological innovation.     

Ending Up in Pizza: Accountability as a Problem of Institutional Arrangement in Brazil

Brazilians often complain that investigations of corruption by public servants drag on for years or bring few legal sanctions on the perpetrators. This lack of accountability is so pervasive that a slang phrase, acabou em pizza , is often invoked when investigations are inconclusive. This article investigates the role of four Brazilian public institutions charged with keeping public servants accountable. For analysis, it breaks the accountability process into its three component stages: oversight, investigation, and sanction. Through a study of six prominent cases of corruption, it shows that the weakness of the accountability process in Brazil is due not entirely to the toothlessness of individual institutions of accountability, but also to the independence of such institutions at each of the three stages. These findings suggest that institutional arrangements influence the degree of accountability, and thereby also public trust and confidence, in Latin America's largest democracy.     

Youth Gangs: A 1990s Perspective

The juvenile gang in the 1990s differs in many significant ways from the gangs described in the “classical” gang studies of the 1950s and 1960s. Juvenile justice professionals should be aware of the changes in the nature, organization, motivation, and activities of gangs and plan intervention strategies accordingly. One important issue in gang research—one which has great implications for public policy—is defining “gang” and “gang-related crime.” The existence of a “gang problem” in a community may be more related to the definition of “gang” and “gang-related” than to the objective issue of whether, or not, a gang problem exists. Further issues relating to the gang of the 1990s involve changing age and sex distribution of gang members, increasing violence by gangs, and deeper involvement with drug distribution. Implications for public policy are discussed.     

Welfare gains from optimization in dynamic planning models

This paper compares the results of two multisectoral models used to plan the dynamic consistency of sectoral investment. Solution of an optimizing model forecasts a frontier of the economy's future choice set. This frontier represents a ten year welfare gain only 2 or 3 percent greater than any investment program simulated by a dynamic Leontief system. The paper explains what efficient behavior accounts for the “better” performance of the optimizing model. Developing dynamic programming models is costly in terms of data, computational complexity, man-machine interaction, and solution interpretation. Therefore, it is recommended that the lessons derived by working with the dynamic LP be applied to improve the planner's control of the less expensive input/output simulation model.