Municipal Bond Issuance: Is There Evidence of a Principal-Agent Problem?

Is there evidence of a principal-agent problem in the municipal bond industry? Do public managers, either on their own or through private sector agents, act to increase their own utility at the expense of the public? This article examines municipal bond decisions in the context of principal-agent theory based on data collected through a random sample survey of municipal bond issuers. Principal-agent theory is not well developed in the public sector. In the municipal bond industry, however, we have evidence that it helps explain the actions of public managers and elected officials, in particular for pay to play and the importance of interest rates vis-à-vis relationships. These actions carry potential costs to citizens.     

Retributivism and the inadvertent punishment of the innocent

Retributivism is generally thought to forbid the punishment of the innocent, even if such punishment would produce otherwise good results, such as deterrence. It has recently been argued that because capital punishment always entails the risk of executing an innocent person, instituting capital punishment is tantamount to intentionally taking innocent lives and therefore cannot be justified on retributive grounds. I argue that there are several versions of retributivism, only one of which might categorically forbid risking punishing innocent persons. I also argue that our moral practices reveal either that we do not hold this particular version of retributivism, or that we reject equating risking punishing the innocent with intentionally doing so. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A9102008 00005     

The competitive impact of health maintenance organizations on hospital finances: an exploratory study

In this study we explore whether HMO-induced competition has contained expenditures in Minneapolis/St. Paul hospitals. Specifically, we assessed the impact of HMOs on revenue, cost, and net income per admission in Twin Cities hospitals from 1979 to 1981. Some HMOs have obtained negotiated discounts from hospitals. We found that hospitals which gave larger discounts did not have lower costs per admission. This finding suggest that discounts do not force hospitals to operate more efficiently. In addition, hospitals with a large share of patients from HMOs or government Medicare and Medicaid programs did not have lower costs per admission than other hospitals during the years from 1979 to 1981. This finding casts doubt on the claim that discounts are justified by lower costs for HMO or government patients. Finally, neither HMO market share nor discounts had an adverse effect on hospital profits. During the three years studied, hospital profits in the Twin Cities showed an upward trend. This study concludes that if competition is to succeed it must encompass more than HMOs. HMOs may be important, but they are only one agent in the market. Thus, public policy created to induce competition must go beyond the simple stimulus of HMO growth.