Politics and the rescue of insolvent savings and loans before 1989

The results presented in this paper are consistent with those predicted by public choice economists who believe that regulatory agencies represent the interests of their controlling congressional committees. Membership on committees is not random; congressmen seek committee assignments where they can represent the interests of their constituency. Congressmen from states where financial institutions are significant will seek membership on their respective banking committees. Once on those committees, congressmen will seek to protect and promote their own constituency. In the case of the savings and loan industry, insolvent savings and loans received benefits from staying in operation. These savings and loans gained another chance to gamble for resurrection. Being shut-down or placed in a management consignment program did not give this option. The results presented in our paper indicate that participation in one of the rescue programs is not random. Savings and loans in states with political power (representation on the Senate banking committee) are less likely to be resolved.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Southern Economic Association Meetings, November 18–21 1990, New Orleans, Louisiana. The authors thank James R. Barth, Henry N. Butler, Gordon Tullock, Lawrence J. White, and an anonymous referee, for helpful comments. Financial support from the Summer Research Program of the College of Business, Boise State University, is gratefully acknowledged. We accept responsibility for any remaining errors.     

I Knew it All Along! Evaluating Time-of-Decision Measures in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Campaign

This paper evaluates the two most common methods of measuring voter time-of-decision??the recall method and the panel method??and asks whether the two methods are consistent with each other. Using data from the National Annenberg Election Survey collected during the 2008 U.S. presidential election, the findings suggest that these two methods measure different concepts, and thus cannot be used interchangeably. Furthermore, discrepancies between the two methods suggest that the accepted model of early, campaign, and late decision-making should be adjusted to account for a fourth group of voters that never changes their vote intention, but does not truly commit to that intention until later in the campaign. The concept of uncommitted early deciders is offered to describe this group, created by combining the two methods.     

Immigration and the new politics of inclusion and exclusion in the European Union: The effect of elites and the EU on individual-level opinions regarding European and non-European immigrants

Abstract. Within European politics, a distinction is currently being made at the elite level between internal and external immigration, with individuals from EU countries being given special rights and privileges when they migrate within the EU. This paper addresses the question of whether individual EU citizens also view the two types of immigrants differently and what structures their beliefs regarding these two sources of migration. The findings indicate that (a) the vast majority of EU citizens view internal and external migration as identical and (b) elite cues and debates regarding immigration within each of the countries are helping individuals form their opinions regarding the two different types of immigration. These findings and their implications are discussed in the body of the paper.