An Attitudinal Response to Role Conflict in Local Government

Local government consists of elected community representatives, who serve on a part-time basis, hold office for a limited term and do not possess particular managerial skills. The chief executive officer (CEO) is appointed to manage the local government entity. Role conflict becomes an issue due to the competing values of the council and the CEO regarding resource allocation and the overall direction of the organisation. This paper looks at the underlying issues of the friction between the volunteer council and the paid staff and what strategies could be implemented to ensure the two functions are complementary and not conflicting.     

Leviathan in the Crosshairs

Following in the spirit of the Leviathan hypothesis, this paper empirically examines how the degree of local government market power influences efficiency in the local public sector. Market power is measured by the number and relative size distribution of similar government units in the same market area. To avoid confusing market power with the comparative efficiency or superiority of larger sized organizations, the relative size distribution of the individual government unit is held constant in the empirical analysis. In the empirical test, aggregate property values serve as the measure of efficiency. The empirical results suggest that aggregate property values are lower and thus efficiency suffers, in more concentrated municipal market areas, ceteris paribus, thus providing some evidence for Leviathan-type governments in Connecticut.     

Judicial Responses to Bright Line Rules in Social Security: In Search of Principle

This article considers judicial responses to the use of 'bright line' rules in social security law. It analyses, within the framework of judicial deference, the receptiveness of the judiciary to an argument by the executive that a rule is justified as being administratively convenient to operate. The article questions the proposition that the judiciary is at its most deferential when complex issues of socio-economic policy or resource allocation are raised in the context of social security law. A contrast is drawn between cases involving an issue of statutory interpretation and those applying a proportionality test. The article tests the presumption that a difference in approach should be discernable in these two situations. It concludes by criticising the courts for failing to articulate clearly the values at stake and by arguing for the need for greater transparency and a broader public debate concerning the use of bright line rules.