Book review

Andrew Linklater and the New Rhetoric in International Relations

Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 263 pp.     

Reinventing the Market? Competition and Regulatory Change in Broadcasting

The reforms instituted by the Broadcasting Act 1990 led to a period of turbulence and upheaval within broadcasting with results that were at best unintended and, at worst, seriously undermined the ideal of public service broadcasting. A Hayekian economic perspective would suggest that the reforms failed because they did not go far enough in the direction of full ÔmarketizationÕ. The paper develops an alternative perspective, based on an adaptation of systems theory within the context of law and economics. This approach offers a broader methodological foundation for the understanding of Ôeconomic lawÕ and a different normative perspective on the broadcasting reforms. It is suggested that the difficulty with these reforms was not their failure to go further in the direction of the market, but rather their lack of clarity in articulating a clear alternative to the market as the basis for the organization of television production.     

Low self-control, rational choice, and student test cheating

Using scenario-based survey data from a sample of 330 university students, this study examined the effects of low self-control, rational choice variables, and control measures on intentions to cheat on a college exam. A moderate bivariate association was observed between low self-control and cheating intentions. However, a series of multivariate regression equations showed that low selfcontrol did not have a significant effect on intentions to cheat once the influence of other variables, especially anticipated shame, were controlled. Furthermore, findings supported the rational choice framework in explaining student decisions to cheat. Implications regarding these findings are discussed.     

Cost disease versus Leviathan explanations of rising government cost: An empirical investigation

In this paper we reexamine the apparently conflicting empirics of Borcherding et al. (1977) versus those of Barry and Lowery (1984). The latter, designed to test the cost disease versus bureau voting power hypotheses on US Citibase annual data between 1947 to 1979, was retested for the longer period available through 1989. Second, and more importantly, we isolate and test for the presence of a second channel for the exercise of bureaucratic power. That channel is the bureau's ability to use its information advantage to capture a portion of newly generated government rents through higher personal benefits (such as higher salaries). Such an analysis (following West, 1991) requires first that those factors generating new rents for government actually result in successful bureaucratic rent-seeking in the form of higher compensation levels. In addition, the analysis requires that these “artificial” increases in bureaucratic wages show up as significant determinants of the higher cost of providing government services. Incorporating a constructed Kau/Rubin variable into the Barry and Lowery database is then shown to improve the predictive power of both the cost disease and bureaucratic power hypotheses for US annual data between 1948 and 1989.