In remembrance of Robert D. Tollison

We discuss the mechanisms related to quadratic voting, from Vickrey’s counter-speculation mechanism and his second-price auction, through the family of Groves mechanisms and its most notable member, the Clarke mechanism, to the expected externality mechanism, Goeree and Zhang’s mechanism, the Groves–Ledyard mechanism, and the Hylland–Zeckhauser mechanism. We show that each mechanism that involves collective decisions has a quadratic aspect and that all of the mechanisms that we discuss are applications of the fundamental insight that for a process to be efficient, all parties involved must bear the marginal social costs of their actions.     

Lessons from a crisis: An analysis of Toyota's handling of the recall crisis

The purpose of this study is to evaluate how Toyota managed the recall crisis through surveying public relations experts. By gathering and analyzing the perspectives of public relations (PR) executives and professors toward the Toyota recall crisis, this study tries to evaluate and measure Toyota's public relations strategies for managing the recall crisis. To collecting data, 34 public relations professors and 92 public relations practitioners were interviewed. According to the findings of this study, PR professionals emphasized that Toyota responded poorly (slowly/dishonestly) and lacked communication with the public. With regard to improvements Toyota may work on, PR experts advised not only to resolve internal corporate problems but also to strengthen the relationships with consumers and obligation to investigate further. In regarding with the lessons from the Toyota's crisis, PR professionals highlighted that it is necessary to take anticipated preventative measures and improve investigative duties and preparation for better dealing with crises.     

Regional socio‐economic variations and deprivation indices

People and Places II: Social and Economic Distinctions in England. By David Gordon and Ray Forrest. SAUS, the University of Bristol, 1995. Pp.135. £19.95.     

WHAT IS A “GOOD” SOCIAL NETWORK FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION? THE FLOW OF KNOW‐HOW FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

This study concerns how intraorganizational networks affect the implementation of policies and practices in organizations. In particular, we attend to the role of the informal subgroup or clique in cultivating and distributing locally adapted and integrated knowledge, or know‐how. We develop two hypotheses based on the importance of intraorganizational coordination for an organization's capacity for change. The first emphasizes the importance of distributing know‐how evenly to potential recipient subgroups. The second emphasizes the importance of restricting know‐how to flow from high know‐how subgroups. We test our hypotheses with longitudinal network data in 21 schools, finding stronger support for the second hypothesis than the first. Our findings can help managers cultivate know‐how flows to contribute to organizational change.     

隐形知识的转型:马来西亚华人家族制造业研究

马来西亚华人家族企业文化的特征是以"家"作为其管理模式,是一种集企业文化与权威于一体的家族文化。在"家族至上"的意识下,企业的成员和个体完全归属于家族,个人利益也须服从于家族利益,一切都以家族利益为重。所有的家族成员都有义务尽全力去追求家族的兴旺、发达和荣耀。家族成员都身居要职,掌握着家族企业的隐性知识和核心秘密。由于马来西亚华人家族的利益和企业利益的高度一致,因此他们都会严守秘密,创新其组织,因而制造出利基产品(Niche Product)而使本身企业在激烈的竞争中立于不败之地。当马来西亚华人中小型家族企业(SMEs)经历世代交替之际,这些华人企业却鲜少着重于如何发展其创办人的隐性知识。然而,为确保企业的永续发展,马来西亚华人企业的新一代已开始将隐性知识更加具体化,培育和创新其企业管理、进行企业改革和改善企业的行销技巧。     

Unemployment and crime: the role of apprehension

An increase in the unemployment rate decreases the opportunity cost of crime and increases the crime rate according to standard microeconomics models. However, a large body of empirical research has shown that an increase in unemployment may increase or decrease crime. By incorporating the return to crime into standard economic models, this paper shows that an increase in unemployment, as in recessions, decreases the opportunity cost of crime and the return to crime as well. As a result, the effect of unemployment on crime is ambiguous and depends on the apprehension rate. An increase in the unemployment rate tends to decrease the crime rate at lower apprehension rates, but to increase it at higher apprehension rates. An increase in the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits does not necessarily reduce the crime rate, and the effect of more generous unemployment insurance on crime depends again on the apprehension rate.