The acetabulum: sex assessment of prehistoric New Zealand Polynesian innominates

With increasing urban development in New Zealand, prehistoric Polynesian skeletal remains are frequently being recovered. Since such material must often be reinterred quickly, it has become important that the sex of individuals be determined from the remains in a relatively short time. For this purpose, discriminant function analysis was utilised for sex determination of prehistoric adult New Zealand Polynesian innominates (21 male and 35 female). Maximum diameter of the acetabulum was measured and subjected to SPSS direct discriminant function analysis. Accuracy of sex determination ranged from 85.2% to 86.2%. Reduction in error over random assignment by sex ranged from 70% to 72%. The two discriminant functions derived will provide a useful tool for the assessment of human remains in the forensic and archaeological context because they incorporate a single measurement which can be taken on incomplete bones.     

The femoral head: sex assessment of prehistoric New Zealand Polynesian skeletal remains

Prehistoric Polynesian skeletal remains are frequently being recovered in New Zealand due to the increasing pace of urbanisation. Since such material must often be reinterred quickly, it is important that the sex of individuals be determined from the remains in a relatively short time. For this purpose, discriminant function analysis was utilised for sex determination of prehistoric adult New Zealand Polynesian femora (47 male and 44 female). Three measurements of the femoral head were taken and subjected to Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) discriminant function analysis. For the discriminant functions derived, accuracy of sex determination ranged from 80.9% to 82.4%. Reduction in error over random assignment by sex ranged from 62% to 65%.     

Transfers of Technology: A Basic Primer On Tax Considerations

The objective of this paper is to introduce managers of R&D operations to tax issues that must be considered when technology is transferred across international boundaries within the same company. The tax implications are often misunderstood or even overlooked in the technology transfer process. The paper explains how countries seek to tax their fair share of the income earned inside their borders. Since the amount of income earned depends on the price for technology paid by one part of a company to another, this transfer price is of keen interest to the tax authorities. To preserve their tax bases, therefore, countries establish rules to regulate the international transfer of goods and services, including technology, between related parties. This paper provides an overview of the economic principles underlying these rules, and illustrates their application with a series of examples.     

BritCrits: Subversion and submission,past, present and future

This article explores some of the intellectual influences which have shaped the development of Critical Legal Studies in Britain and the contexts in which these influences made themselves felt. It then considers which influences might or should steer Critical Legal Studies in the future. In terms of the past, specific attention is given to the influence of Marxism, Freud and Lacan, feminism, Foucault and Derrida, and recent genres of history-writing. As to the future, the question is asked whether Critical Legal Studies will engage constructively with recent developments in the life sciences and the philosophy of science, and, more generally, whether it will be able to surpass its established mooring in the philosophy of history. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Relationship between Bond Returns and Inflation in a Controlled Economy

This research finds empirical evidence indicating that smoothed real asset prices lead security prices in a controlled economy. The results are important for illustrating the effect controlled inflation can have on controlled security prices.     

The case for public‐private partnerships in infrastructure

Abstract: Much of the public debate about public‐private partnerships (P3s) has occurred through the lens of those who either oppose or support this increasingly popular method of delivering public infrastructure assets. Despite some scepticism in the academic literature, an analysis of the key arguments for and against P3s concludes that the P3 model can successfully deliver public infrastructure goods and services, provided that certain key thresholds are met. Lessons learned from early experiments in P3s and from the experience of the newer government P3 procurement agencies suggest that P3s can provide value for money if risk is allocated to the party best able to manage it. An appropriate risk allocation requires that governments have the expertise to identify all of the relevant risks before entering into the partnership contract. Governments must also have the contract management skills to ensure that those risks are in fact borne by the private sector. To maintain public confidence in the P3 model, governments must live up to their own obligations of transparency and accountability and not succumb to private‐sector demands for confidentiality. The article recognizes that not all government goods and services can meet the threshold but that, if they do, it argues strongly for the efficiency and effectiveness of the P3 model. Sommaire: Une grande partie du débat public au sujet des partenariats entre le secteur public et le secteur privé (les P3) a eu lieu par l'entremise de ceux qui opposent ou soutiennent cette méthode de plus en plus populaire de livrer de l'infrastructure publique. En dépit d'un certain scepticisme émanant des documents d'universitaires, une analyse des principaux arguments en faveur des P3 et contre ceux‐ci conclut que les P3 peuvent livrer avec succès des produits et services d'infrastructure publique, à condition que certains seuils clés soient atteints. Les enseignements tirés des premières expériences de P3 et de l'expérience des plus récents organismes d'approvisionnement gouvernementaux P3 laissent entendre que les P3 peuvent apporter une optimisation des ressources si le risque est attribuéà la partie la plus apte à le gérer. Une bonne répartition du risque exige que les gouvernements aient l'expertise pour identifier tous les risques pertinents avant de signer le contrat de partenariat. Les gouvernements doivent aussi avoir les compétences en gestion de contrats nécessaires pour veiller à ce que les risques soient en fait assumés par le secteur privé. Pour maintenir la confiance du public dans le modèle de P3, les gouvernements doivent respecter leurs engagements de transparence et de reddition de comptes et ne pas céder aux exigences du secteur privé concernant la protection des renseignements personnels. L'article reconnaît que tous les produits et services gouvernementaux ne peuvent pas tous atteindre le seuil de conformités mais que, lorsqu'ils y parviennent, le modèle de P3 est alors hautement efficace et efficient.