What are the factors behind the successful EU-China cooperation on the subnational level? Case study of the Lodzkie region in Poland

Asia Europe Journal - Analysing the relations between the EU and China one can notice a growing network of links on all levels, including subnational. Within the framework of the One Belt One Road...     

Revisiting country of origin principle: Challenges related to regulating e-commerce in the European Union

The article analyses the country of origin principle of information society services in the light of harmonisation and unification efforts undertaken by the European lawgiver. Although the country of origin principle remains the key element of the construction of freedom to provide information society services, the principle itself suffers a number of both explicit and implicit restrictions which render its practical application a serious challenge. The difficulty is posed by the fact that the Electronic Commerce Directive fails to expressly specify both the scope of harmonisation as regards the principle, and the level of harmonisation of the directive itself. Furthermore, it is understood differently by private international lawyers. In the eDate Advertising case the ECJ ruled that the principle is not a conflict-of-laws rule, neither does it require implementation to the national legal systems in this shape. This is not to mean, however, that the debate over the function of the country of origin principle in private international law is over. Last but not least, there are many different types of country of origin principles applicable to various types of services provided via the Internet. This multitude of country of origin principles is perhaps the greatest weakness the regulatory approach adopted by the European lawmaker.     

Minimal Semantics and Legal Interpretation

In this paper I will tackle three issues. First, I aim to briefly outline the backbone of semantic minimalism, while focusing on the idea of ‘liberal truth conditions’ developed by Emma Borg in her book ‘Minimal Semantics’. Secondly, I will provide an account of the three principal views in legal interpretation: intentionalism, textualism and purposivism. All of them are based on a common denominator labelled by lawyers ‘literal meaning’. In the paper I suggest a novel way of viewing this common denominator as almost identical to the Borgian ‘liberal truth conditions’, at least at a conceptual level. In the third section I will focus on the conceptual similarities between the two ideas. I intend to depict that, although legal theorists do not admit it explicitly, they treat literal legal meaning as minimal propositional content that can be ascribed liberal truth conditions. There are two main objections to liberal truth conditions: their under-determinacy and unintuitive character. Both objections can be applied to ‘literal meaning’. However, the idea of liberal truth conditions gives an adequate account of what lawyers call literal meaning and is helpful in explaining the mechanism of understanding of provisions and reasons leading to the necessity of statutory interpretation.