Policy design as craft: teasing out policy design expertise using a semi-experimental approach

Public policy research typically neglects the role of the individual policy actor with most accounts of the policy process instead privileging the role of governmental systems, institutions, processes, organizations; organised interests or networks of multiple actors. The policy design literature suffers from similar limitations, with very few authors paying attention to the crucial work of the individual policy designer or considering how the latter’s skills, expertise and creativity are employed in the design task. This represents a significant weakness in our understanding of how policy is formulated. This paper outlines and previews what we believe is a potentially fruitful semi-experimental methodological tool for exploring how individual policy actors draw on knowledge, expertise, intuition and creativity in framing and responding to complex policy issues. Real-time scenario-based problem-solving exercises are used to explore how policy problems and solutions are framed and articulated by novice (first-term politicians and early career bureaucrats) and experienced (former cabinet ministers and senior civil servants) policy actors and to examine the strategies and approaches they employ in response to specific problem cues. Initial findings are discussed, and we conclude by advancing potential refinements of the instrument and directions for future research.     

The new Voteview.com: preserving and continuing Keith Poole’s infrastructure for scholars,students and observers of Congress

For the last 40 years, Keith Poole has developed and curated a trove of basic data and measurements related to the United States Congress. He has made these resources freely available through his widely-used Voteview.com website since 1995. At Poole’s Voteview.com, scholars, students, journalists, and the broader public could download gold-standard historical and current roll-call voting data, member rosters, NOMINATE scores, and measures and visualizations of party cohesion and polarization, among many other useful things. In this article, we describe how we are preserving and continuing these vast public-goods contributions through the new Voteview.com. Developed and housed at UCLA, the new Voteview.com carries on the creation of basic roll-call data infrastructure, including the assignment of Poole’s widely-used ICPSR number-like identifiers to new members, data on every roll-call vote ever taken, NOMINATE scores and other standard roll-call vote-based measures such as party-loyalty scores. In addition to serving as a platform for the continuation and dissemination of this basic data infrastructure, the new Voteview.com also provides powerful tools for exploring the history of roll-call voting, the US Congress, and American politics and political history through a simple search interface and interactive visualizations.     

The Confidence Game: Madoff and the 17th Floor Ensemble

This is the third in a series of five articles focusing on how Bernard Madoff’s confidence game (con game) worked. This paper looks at more of the activities of the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS) employees who were Madoff’s accomplices. Not surprisingly, deception was rampant at the BLMIS IA (investment advisory) business where criminal activities continued for decades. An examination of other con games shows clearly that pretending, misrepresenting, and dissembling were hardly unique to Madoff’s con.     

How do mayors get elected? The causal effects of pre-electoral coalitions on mayoral election outcomes in Indonesia

ABSTRACT

What determines the election of mayors? The extent to which pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) influence mayoral election outcomes has not yet been subject to empirical analysis, despite the question’s fundamental theoretical and practical relevance. This note uses regression discontinuity methods to identify the causal effects of PECs on mayoral election results in Indonesia. The study finds that candidates backed by PECs comprising political parties that control council seat shares exceeding first-round mayoral electoral vote thresholds are 14–18 percentage points more likely to win those elections than their counterparts supported by smaller-sized PECs. The analysis determines that PECs are especially helpful in getting non-incumbent candidates elected, although they have no apparent impact on incumbents’ electoral success. PECs can assist candidates in gaining office, therefore, but they are established under corrupt conditions. Ultimately, governance issues surrounding the formation and functioning of PECs impose significant constraints on the development of local democracy in Indonesia.     

Donors’ Responses to Profit Incentives in the Social Sector: The Entrepreneurial Orientation Reward and the Profit Penalty

This study uses an online survey experiment to test whether the pairing of profit-seeking with mission-related programs in the social sector attracts or deters donations from individual donors. We test individuals’ response to three types of profit incentives allowed under current U.S. public policy: (1) non-distributed profit to an organization, which is allowed for nonprofit entities; (2) profit to the organization's equity investors and owners, which is allowed under for-profit social enterprise governance charters; and (3) profit to lending investors, which is introduced by social impact bonds, a pay-for-success policy tool. We test trust theory, under which profit incentives deter donors against entrepreneurial orientation (EO) theory, which suggests that donors are attracted to organizations that use innovative, market-driven programs. Findings indicate support for both theories, but the support depends on how the specific profit incentive is structured. Donors support organizations that use profit-generating social enterprise programs—but only when the profits are non-distributable; donors’ support is significantly lower for social enterprises in which owners and equity investors may profit. Importantly however, this negative effect is not found for pay-for-success policy tools where lending investors, rather than equity investors and owners, receive profits.     

EU update

This is the latest edition of Baker & McKenzie’s column on developments in EU law relating to IP, IT and telecommunications. This article summarises recent developments that are considered important for practitioners, students and academics in a wide range of information technology, e-commerce, telecommunications and intellectual property areas. It cannot be exhaustive but intends to address the important points. This is a hard copy reference guide, but links to outside web sites are included where possible. No responsibility is assumed for the accuracy of information contained in these links.