WHEN TO USE AND WHEN TO AVOID MEDIATION

This article examines voluntary mediation and provides suggested criteria for attorneys in deciding whether or not to use mediation. The author discusses what mediation has to offer, what it takes to make it work, and important cautions for attorneys in deciding about the use of this process.     

Identification of the driver in two-rider motorcycle accidents. Inguinal contusion-laceration as an indication of the driver

In motorcycle accidents involving two riders, medicolegal identification of the driver is necessary when one or both riders die. It is particularly important in the latter case, because the survivor almost always insists that he or she was not driving. One characteristic injury that distinguishes the driver from the passenger is inguinal contusion-laceration (accompanied internally by pelvic fracture). This injury, caused by collision of the pelvis with the fuel tank, identifies the driver.     

Is full better than half? Examining the longitudinal effects of full‐day kindergarten attendance

Kindergarten policy varies widely both across and within states. Over the past decade, a number of states have instituted a full‐day kindergarten requirement and others are considering it as a way to increase educational achievement. Many parents also support full‐day kindergarten as a source of child care. This paper uses the Early Child Longitudinal Study–Kindergarten Class of 1998–1999 to evaluate the efficacy of this policy. In ordinary least squares, probit, county fixed effects, and instrumental variables models, we find that there are initial benefits for students and the mothers of students who attend full‐day kindergarten, but that these differences largely evaporate by third grade. Contrary to claims by some advocates, attending full‐day kindergarten is found to have no additional benefit for students in families with income below the poverty threshold. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

Error minimization and deterrence in agency control

In the presented oversight model, in which a regulatory agency may collude with regulatees, a watchdog organization may scrutinize the agency’s decision-making and find evidence speaking for collusive behavior. Found evidence is of a specific, stochastic quality. Courts will overturn the administrative decision when the evidence presented in court exceeds a minimum quality standard set by the political principal. Lowering the quality standard increases the odds of finding evidence of sufficient quality and, hence, leads to increasing collusion deterrence and to a lower probability of acquitting collusive administrators (type I error), but also to a higher probability of convicting an innocent administrator (type II error). It is shown that, when welfare-maximization gives rise to an interior solution, the welfare-maximizing standard of evidence is lower than the one that merely minimizes the costs of legal errors without taking deterrence costs into account, but will imply incomplete deterrence. However, conditions can and will be identified under which both error cost minimization and complete deterrence coincide with welfare-maximization.