谁在澳门赌博？

澳门的赌博税税率远高于拉斯维加斯,但赌业规模已赶上拉斯维加斯赌桌正在澳门旋转。在这亚洲首屈一指的赌博之城,赌业规模已赶上拉斯维加斯。美国赌场经营者鉴于本国市场趋于成熟,自2002年澳门赌博业开放竞争后。开始将巨资押注于这     

WHEN MISSING DATA ARE NOT MISSING: A NEW APPROACH TO EVALUATING SUPPLEMENTAL HOMICIDE REPORT IMPUTATION STRATEGIES*

The Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR) are widely used in criminological research and inform a broad range of research topics and subsequent policy applications. A serious issue with the SHR is missing information about the offender and incident in many recorded homicides. Although it is convenient to discard cases with missing data before analysis, such discarding is not theoretically justified and can lead to incorrect substantive conclusions. Recently, several techniques for imputing missing SHR data have been proposed, but it is difficult to evaluate their effectiveness. This research presents a new approach to testing and evaluating SHR imputation techniques. Offender data that are missing in the SHR are often found in police records available for individual cities. We examine similarities and differences among cases with known offender characteristics in the SHR, cases with such information missing in the SHR but available in police records, and cases with such information missing in both sources. We then use these data sets to evaluate four different imputation techniques suggested in the literature (Fox, 2004; Messner, Deane, and Beaulieu, 2002; Pampel and Williams, 2000; Regoeczi and Riedel, 2003). We apply each imputation technique to the SHR, and for cases with information missing in the SHR but known in the police records, we see how well the imputed values correspond both with the individual known values and with the overall distributions in the police records. We discuss the outcome of our assessment of these strategies, and we outline important implications this assessment has for research using SHR data.     

Bureaucracy Versus Markets in Hospital Care: The Dutch Case

In this paper we analyze the bureaucratic negotiation processthat is implied by the budgeting system applied in Dutchhospital care. This system is based on centralized pricesetting while simultaneously allowing for decentralizednegotiations on volumes. We apply a variant of the bureaucracytheory, according to which the bureaucratic agency (in ourcase the joint hospitals) are not allowed to pricediscriminate, but will receive a flat price per unit ofoutput. We find that central price setting, where the insurercannot exploit its information on hospital costs, leads to asuboptimal supply of hospital care.