Conclusion: The Future of Belgian Federalism—Between Reform and Swansong?

This article summarizes the main arguments of the special issue. It also probes into the deficiencies of the Belgian federal system and argues that the most recent crisis of Belgian federalism (2007–11) is not the result of rising socio-economic differences between Flanders and Wallonia, but the consequence of building a bipolar federation on to a split party system. The article concludes by identifying some potential roadmaps (federal reform, confederalism, and the referendum) for the future.     

Immunoenzyme AB0 blood group determination using a single hair. I

The immunoenzyme technique was used to determine the ABO blood group of strands of human scalp hair. The hair was obtained from 168 individuals of known blood groups (A1: n = 58; A2: n = 11; B: n = 28; O: n = 46; A1B: n = 16; A2B: n = 9). Immunostaining was carried out by using monoclonal anti-A, anti-B and anti-H as primary antibodies. Group-specific staining was clearly observed within the medulla of the hair. The ABO blood group of all hair samples was determined correctly by the Sternberger (PAP) or APAAP (immunoalkaline phosphatase) technique. The present study indicates that immunoenzyme techniques can be regarded as practical methods for determining ABO blood group of hair.     

The economic effects of federalism and?decentralization—a cross-country assessment

This paper explores the idea that institutional details matter and that attempts to estimate the economic effects of federalism by employing a simple dummy variable neglect potentially important institutional details. Based on a principal component analysis, seven aspects of both federalism and decentralization are used as variables for explaining differences in (1) fiscal policy, (2) government effectiveness, (3) economic productivity, and (4) happiness. The results show that institutional details do, indeed, matter. Different aspects of federalism impact on the outcome variables to different degrees. This study adds to our knowledge on the transmission mechanisms of federalism and decentralization.     

The issue of instability in a simple policy game between the central bank and a representative union

In the recent economic literature the independence of the central bank is often considered to be one of the most effective guarantees to achieve price stability. A strong theoretical basis for this proposition is that the monetary policy delegation given to an independent central bank is an optimal instrument to avoid the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. This paper investigates the stability properties of this solution in a simple game in which the private sector (i.e. the trade unions) and the public sector (i.e. the central bank) simultaneously interact. A representative monopoly union is considered, and – in line with the recent economic debate – two types of unions are investigated: (i) the standard micro-founded trade union; (ii) the inflation-averse trade union. In both cases, we find that the requirement for the Nash equilibrium to be stable imposes a limit to the conservativeness of the central bank. Instability of the Nash equilibrium reveals a strategic co-ordination failure between the public and the private sector.     

Rethinking central planning: A federal critique of the Planning Commission

ABSTRACT

This article critically assesses the impact of the Planning Commission on center-state relations in India. It argues that the Planning Commission had a centralizing effect due to its role in overseeing five year and annual planning, its contribution to designing and overseeing Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS), and its involvement in discretionary grant-making. Central policy priorities and inter-state disagreements prevented the Planning Commission from acquiring the role of a shared rule institution, capable of offsetting the centralizing implications of the aforementioned policies. The article then speculates on what prompted the recent replacement of the Planning Commission with the NITI Aayog and what this may mean for shared rule and the nature of collaborative federalism in India more in general.