Asymmetric Federalism and Coalition-Making in Belgium

This article examines the asymmetric aspects of Belgian federalism.The term "asymmetry" covers many meanings. The cultural, socioeconomic,political party, and formal-institutional differences betweenthe regions of the Belgian federation clearly make Belgium astrong case of asymmetry. However, these asymmetric featureshave largely been neutralized by preferences of the major-partyleaders for building symmetric or congruent government coalitionsin the federal and regional arenas. The article not only explainswhy Belgian party elites have acted accordingly but also demonstratesthat the genuine meaning of asymmetry cannot be understood properlywithout putting the concept of asymmetry into the frameworkof party politics.     

Tax authority to the European Parliament?

In this paper we analyze whether countries of the EC community should plead for a decentralized system to finance the European funds rather than using a uniform tax imposed by the European parliament. The analysis is within a multistage game-theoretic framework in which the implication of the financing system of a confederation on the investment behavior in the respective states is considered. The paper is in the tradition of the literature which claims that from a view of global efficiency property-rights structures inducing ex-post efficient allocations may be worse than a system leading to an ex-post inefficient allocation. For this specific economic issue we elucidate the tradeoff between incentive effect and distributional policy. Especially we demonstrate that rather homogeneous countries benefit by installing a central tax institution. If the countries are rather heterogeneous, the countries may have opposing interests with respect to the answer of the question which is presented in the title. It is possible that the “high-developed” country prefers to install a central tax authority while the “low-developed” country does not. However, in general the reverse ordering which is more in line with our intuition results.     

The changing character of national borders

At the end of the twentieth century, the pace of change in the international system is increasing. New actors and even new categories of actors are emerging. Some have a strong impact on international relations, thus competing with the traditional type of international actor, the sovereign nation‐state. One salient feature of the nation‐state is its power to control its borders. In the process of globalization, this power is being disintegrated.

In some respects, national borders have completely lost their relevance, owing to certain adverse ecological developments like the degradation of the ozone layer and other virtually global threats. They are equally of limited use in influencing the speed and content of some trade operations concerning goods or currencies or the free flow of media information.

They however continue to function in a rather efficient way for people. Immigration laws and certain other procedures of the ‘rich’ countries tend to distinguish between wanted and unwanted immigrants. Due to various catastrophies and disasters, wide‐spread violence and the anticipation of a bleak economic future, the number of migrants continues to grow rapidly, as does the pressure from migrants from the ‘poor’ and densely populated countries of the world on the borders of the ‘rich’ countries. This is a multi‐dimensional development with political, economic, but also moral aspects.     

The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini

Persson and Tabellini (The Economic Effects of Constitutions, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003) show that presidential regimes and majoritarian election systems have important economic effects. Here, the number of countries is expanded and more recent data is used. In replicating and extending their analyses, we find that the effect of presidential regimes vanishes almost entirely. With regard to electoral systems, the original results are largely confirmed: majoritarian (as opposed to proportional) electoral systems lead to lower government expenditure, lower levels of rent seeking but also lower output per worker. The institutional details, such as the proportion of candidates that are not elected on party lists and district size, are particularly important.     

Dynamiken von Gesetzgebungsinitiativen der Bundes- und Landesparteien im deutschen Föderalismus. Eine Analyse für den Bereich der Rechte Minderjähriger, 1990 bis 2014

The article explores how parties influence legal change in federal systems. Analysing 310 initiatives to change German legislation concerning minors’ rights (which fall into federal and land jurisdiction) for the period from 1990 to 2014, the study opens up empirically a new legislative domain which has been largely ignored by political science so far. It investigates the initiating parties, issues, positions, timing, and cross-level government constellation and corroborates that parties in Germany coordinate their legislative initiatives across lands and levels. At the same time, the data indicate that German land parties are not mere agents of the federal parties and do not utilize the länder level for law-making against federal majorities. The many federal and länder initiatives instead give room for discourse and provide incentives for (re)adjusting party positions which in the long run fosters legal changes.