Structural reform,institutions and earnings: Evidence from the formal and informal sectors in urban Peru

Reforms undertaken in Peru in the early 1990s might have resulted in a slight reduction of the informal sector. Costs associated with becoming and staying informal, and benefits of becoming formal might have increased. This, when a legalistic definition of informality is used. Earnings differentials between formal and informal self‐employed workers are negligible although they persist between formal and informal salaried workers. Skilled workers are more likely to be found in the formal sector and informal wage earners tend to be younger and less skilled. The earnings generating process for both the formal and the informal self‐employed workers is similar.     

Reform: budgeting and financial management

In compliance with the commitments undertaken at the European Union and in harmony with the general restructuring of public administration, a far-reaching budget reform was approved in 1997 changing the philosophy and the structure of the existing budget system and the management of public resources. The new system is based on the linkage between budget allocation and performance, on specification of functions, programs and objectives and assessment of results. This study illustrates the major developments of the previous system and the dramatic changes introduced with the 1997 reform.     

Britain,France, and Mesopotamian Oil, 1916–1920

This analysis centres on British and French policies concerning Mesopotamian oil between 1916 and 1920. Both Powers already had some degree of interest in oil matters before the war, but these concerns did not leave a particularly strong imprint on the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. During the First World War, both Britain and France became aware of their lack of oil and identified Mesopotamian oil as a key war aim. Both Powers developed close relations with Royal Dutch-Shell to further their oil policies. After the war, the struggle for oil proved inseparable from the territorial settlement in the Middle East and relations with oil companies. All actors did not initially recognise this fact, and it was only during 1919–1920 that an increasing awareness developed that oil and territorial issues were inseparable. Combined with changes in political leadership, it made possible a “silent compromise” at San Remo in April 1920.     

Child pornography possessors: Comparisons and contrasts with contact- and non-contact sex offenders

Abstract

The advent of the internet has facilitated a dramatic increase in the number of individuals accessing and possessing child pornography and a corresponding increase in referrals for assessment and treatment. Questions remain regarding whether child pornography possessors are more similar to or different from other types of sex offenders, and whether or not assessment and treatment protocols for contact and non-contact sex offenders are applied appropriately to child pornography offenders. The present study compared 50 child pornography offenders, 45 non-contact sex offenders and 101 contact child molesters. The results indicated that the three groups were more similar than different; however, child pornography offenders were distinguished by greater academic and vocational achievement, fewer childhood behaviour problems and by select relational variables. Recidivism rates were low for all groups.     

苏东地区“现实社会主义”的垮台和当前社会主义计划的重新制定

前言 自社会主义作为理论和政治实践出现以来，一直是人们思考和分析的问题。在整个20世纪，不同国家的社会主义革命补充了社会主义计划具体形成的根本问题并对已经出现的社会主义经验做出评价，其中一些经验继续朝着乐观的方向发展。     

Institutionalizing uncertainty: the choice of electoral formulas

Taken from an infinite set of divisors methods, the D’Hondt formula is the unique rule that maximizes the minimum number of seats for parties exceeding average size but not surpassing an absolute majority of the votes. This property is also shared, in the quota set of methods, by the Droop formula. At the same time, these two methods are those most commonly observed in practice. This paper relates the property stated to the observed facts. If parties try to maximize the minimum number of seats for a given share of votes, then the D’Hondt formula should be chosen. This choice is consistent with rational parties that make institutional choices in an uncertain environment.     

Fighting Organized Crime, with Particular Reference to Mafia Crimes in Italy

The special legal regulation of mafia crimes in Italy operatesat very different levels: at that of investigations, of criminalproceedings, of sentencing and of imprisonment. This legal regimeis based on a double track treatment, which generally speaking,is very harsh, but may turn especially lenient whenever a personopts out of a criminal group and decides to cooperate with theprosecution. In the daily fight against mafia crimes as wellas criminal offences perpetrated by other criminal organizationsor ‘associations’, the role of ‘cooperatingwitnesses’ has proven to be of pivotal importance. Anotheruseful prosecutorial tool developed by the Italian courts isthe notion of ‘external support to mafia associations’,although this now needs to be laid down in legislation. It is,in this writer's experience, the coordination of investigationsthat is critical to the prosecution and punishment of mafiacrimes, and to the dismantlement of mafia associations.     

Regulation as a cause of firm fragmentation:the case of the Spanish construction industry

Team members organize their relationships to achieve efficient incentives in accordance with institutional constraints. When these constraints change, the rights and tasks of members are reallocated, generating a new contractual structure [or governance mechanism] that solves more easily the problem of collective action associated with team production. We show how this process has worked in the case of Spanish construction firms, in which more restrictive labor and tax regulations have induced parties to substitute market contracts for labor contracts because of the need to avoid moral hazards. We argue that this explains the increased fragmentation of the Spanish construction industry, and technical change does not seem to account for this process.     

Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control

Bureaucratic compliance is often crucial for political survival, yet eliciting that compliance in weakly institutionalized environments requires that political principals convince agents that their hold on power is secure. We provide a formal model to show that electoral manipulation can help to solve this agency problem. By influencing beliefs about a ruler's hold on power, manipulation can encourage a bureaucrat to work on behalf of the ruler when he would not otherwise do so. This result holds under various common technologies of electoral manipulation. Manipulation is more likely when the bureaucrat is dependent on the ruler for his career and when the probability is high that even generally unsupportive citizens would reward bureaucratic effort. The relationship between the ruler's expected popularity and the likelihood of manipulation, in turn, depends on the technology of manipulation.