Retribution or Truth-Telling in South Africa? Legacies of the Transitional Phase

Almost from the start of South Africa's transition to democracy in the 1990s, the issue arose of how those both within the National Party government and from the opposition who had committed human rights abuses would be treated. Like many other countries undergoing democratic regime change, South Africa's endeavors to exorcise the demons of its past while ensuring stability have depended and continue to depend to a certain extent on the delicate choice between truth telling and retribution, a choice, in turn, closely tied to the process of democratization and to the distibution of power within the body that led the change. The authors ask how the nature of the South African transition and the character of the transitional authority affected the treatment of past abuses. They further examine the way the transitional authorities balanced retribution and truth telling and the consequences of their actions for the stability of the new democracy.     

Strategic agricultural trade policy interdependence and the exchange rate: A game theoretic analysis

Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence is modeled using a game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the European Community, the United States and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium outcome of this game. Without compensatory payments to those with the highest political influence, the results suggest that only modest reform is possible. With compensation, liberalization occurs but free trade is not obtained. Simulations also indicate that the U.S. gains incentive to reduce protection given a depreciation of the dollar, while incentive to liberalize trade policies decreases as the dollar appreciates. Research was supported by Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station project 14065 “Economic Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Implications for U.S. Agriculture.”     

EVALUATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY: LESSONS FROM DETROIT'S CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL PARK PROJECT

Success in implementing the Central Industrial Park project required clearing a 500-acre site for a new General Motors assembly plant, at a public sector cost of more than $200 million, in less than two years, to meet a deadline set by the corporation; clearance involved relocation of 3.500 people and more than 100 businesses, and demolition of 1,500 structures. Despite the complexity of the project and the need for approvals from multiple decision makers at the local, state, and national level, timely implementation was possible because of consensus on the project and i t s importance, formulation of special organizational structures and procedures, the actions and influence of the mayor and his development director as I'fixers, and redefinition and expansion of the statutory authority of officials responsible for project implementation. The crisis atmosphere in which project decisions were made, a consequence of corporate deadlines and the city's desperate economic situation, was essential to the effective combination of these forces. The price for success was steep, however, including higher acquisition and relocation costs, reduction of property tax revenues from the project to minimal levels for 30 years, and transfer of control over the formation and implementation of economic development policy to the private sector.