Testing the limits of freedom of contract: the commercialization of reproductive materials and services

This article examines the cases for and against commercializing, or "commodifying," reproductive materials and services. Using a supply/demand third-party framework, three basic scenarios in which commercial-exchange relationships may be possible--exchange of gametes and zygotes, exchange of gestational services, and exchange of fetal material--and the major parties of interest, or stakeholders, are identified. The study sketches the liberal, essentialist, and radical contingency theories that shape the debate over the commercialization of reproductive materials and services. The article then attempts to derive some basic governing principles that reflect as much common ground as possible amongst these various normative perspectives, while recognizing that complete reconciliation is impossible. Taken together, these principles are designed to reflect a strategy of "constrained commodification," where commercialization or commodification, that is, financial remuneration, plays a relatively neutral role in the utilization of reproductive materials and services. In light of these principles, the article concludes by sketching legal and regulatory regimes with respect to the exchange of gametes and zygotes, gestational services, and fetal tissue.     

Are the similarities between a woman's right to choose an abortion and the alleged right to assisted suicide really compelling?

In this Article, Marc Spindelman examines the relationship between abortion and assisted suicide. He begins his discussion with the constitutional framework within which courts should consider the assertion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual's decision to commit assisted suicide. The Author then considers and, based on relevant Supreme Court doctrine, rejects the conception of personal autonomy that undergirds the claimed constitutional right to assisted suicide. Finally, the Author points out some legal and cultural distinctions between abortion and assisted suicide, arguing that these distinctions offer courts good reasons for holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of liberty does not include the liberty to commit assisted suicide. In addition, the Author makes a few observations about recent assisted-suicide cases decided by the Ninth and Second Circuits.