行政立法程序的民主与效率

行政立法程序既应追求行政行为的效率,又应追求立法行为的民主。在民主与效率之间,行政立法程序应以民主为更高的价值追求。针对我国目前的法律、法规及行政立法的现状,在行政立法准备制定阶段应建立更为民主的制度,但同时也不能忽略行政立法程序的效率。     

Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility

This paper reviews China's recent efforts to enact a competitionpolicy (antitrust) law. We focus on three issues: (1) What isthe substance of the proposed law, and how does it differ fromexisting antitrust law in other countries, (2) How will thelaw be implemented or enforced, and how will those who mustimplement this law interpret their mandate, and (3) What willbe the likely effects of this law given China's unique historyand cultural heritage. We emphasize China's economic, legaland regulatory contexts in which an antitrust law may be enforced.Our central focus is the problem of establishing a substantiveand procedural legal framework that is incentive-compatiblewith economic efficiency and growth. The draft law could beimproved, both to increase its clarity and to make its enforcementmore consistent with the goal of achieving improvements in economicefficiency. Nevertheless, there is much merit in the draft,especially its strong focus on reducing anticompetitive practicesof state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other government bodies.However, our major difficulty with the new law is that, in theabsence of a tradition of reliance on the rule of law, Chineseand foreign enterprises will find it very difficult to relyon the antitrust statute or the actions of the courts in Chinaas a basis for predicting the antitrust liability that mightresult from various business practices. Therefore, the principalvector by which antitrust law (or indeed any law) affects economicbehavior is absent from the Chinese scene. Unless the bureaucracythat enforces the new antitrust law actively pursues a policyof consistent enforcement based on written guidelines, staredecisis, or other sources of predictability, the substance ofthe statute itself will have little significance. That outcomewould represent a significant loss for the economic welfareof the Chinese people.     

Assessing Market Power: The Trade-off Between Market Concentration and Multi-Market Participation

This analysis reveals that traditional market power measuresare biased under the conditions of multi-market participationand demand interdependence. Specifically, when complementary(substitutable) demands dominate, traditional market power measuresare biased upward (downward). A similar bias carries over tothe evaluation of mergers. To wit, mergers that simultaneouslyincrease market concentration and multi-market participationcan result in lower prices even in the absence of merger economies.It follows that merger guidelines that place undue emphasison market concentration can lead policymakers to block (approve)mergers that enhance (diminish) consumer welfare.     

Fertility and migration in the heart of the industrial revolution.

This study examines demographic growth and change in Tilleur in the valley of Meuse in Belgium during 1807-80 during the process of industrialization and urbanization. The proportion of immigrants (foreigners and Flemings) increased from 15% in 1807 to 65% in 1856. After 1856, population and industrial growth stabilized. During 1856-66 the proportion of natives stabilized, and the proportion of Flemings increased. It is argued that in Tilleur there were two phases: a foundation phase of industrial and population growth and a phase of maturation with decreased non-native population and greater similarity between groups. Immigrants contributed to the birth rate in greater proportions than their proportion in the population of Tilleur. During 1847-66 native population increased annually from 2.4% to 3.8%. Migrants' annual increases were diminished by the effects of mortality but expanded by the influence of in-migration. During 1857-66 the proportion of foreigners declined and marked the transition to a new phase. During 1830-66 the sex ratio grew from 93 to 119. During the Industrial Revolution in Tilleur, women shifted from outnumbering to undernumbering men. The iron and coal in the region attracted men. The sex ratio among the Flemish was 214 in 1866. In 1830 the proportion of fertile women was higher among immigrants and declined thereafter. Age at marriage rose for natives and declined for immigrants. The native population structure by sex, age, and marriage did not favor the birth rate. During 1866-80 the birth rate of foreign immigrants and rural natives declined, the birth rate of natives doubled, and the gap between these two groups narrowed. The changes among immigrants during the foundation phase led to fertility decline in the maturation phase. Marriage and migration interactions linked the industrial revolution with the demographic transition.     

The effect of authority and social influence on eyewitness suggestibility and person recognition

This study investigated the influence of an authority figure on eyewitness identification. Participants watched a staged crime and then were administered a photo lineup by either an authority (policeman) or non-authority figure (civilian). Participants in the authority condition were more likely to choose a lineup member than those in the non-authority condition. There was no effect of authority, however, on the accuracy of the identification decisions. The lack of a deleterious effect suggests that the presence of a police officer during identification procedures does not create an unduly suggestive situation or have undesirable effects on eyewitness identification decisions. Although witnesses' choosing behaviors did not increase the rate of identification errors, the effect of the administrator's authority on choosing was reduced when unbiased instructions (vs. biased instructions) were presented to the witnesses. Thus, support was found for the use of neutral instructions during eyewitness identification procedures.     

Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies: Reply

Further tests and thoughts on the OECD data lead me to conclude that, if anything, my 1986 paper underestimated the magnitude of the inverse relation between economic growth and government size. If one takes the nominal-based measure of government scale, as advised by Saunders, the significance levels, coefficient magnitudes and goodness of fits improve over what I found with my initial investigation. I would suggest that Saunders reconsider his reluctance to believe that the size of the public sector is unrelated to economic growth in OECD countries over this time period.One additional thought appears relevant to the current policy debate concerning budget deficits and economic performance within the major industrialized economies. The empirical work displayed here and in my 1986 paper suggests serious problems associated with the various proposals urging governments to raise taxes and/or ease fiscal policy. Elsewhere, I have suggested that available empirical evidence implies that plans to increase taxes as a way out of budget deficits are plans that carry the potential for raising government spending and possibly future deficits as well. Coupled with the evidence presented here, we should also recognize the potential of tax increases to raise the level of government participation in a country and, accordingly, exert inverse influences on its future economic performance as well. As suggested in my 1986 paper, the empirical evidence may suggest the following irony: While political participants may crave larger and larger non-market resource allocations, their future ability to satisfy that craving may very well be severely constrained by the satisfaction of that same appetite.