The Politics of Fiscal Austerity: Implications for the United States

As austerity becomes the new normal for advanced nations, questions are raised about whether nations can make the hard choices necessary to bring about a sustainable fiscal future. The political defeat experienced by so many European governments undertaking fiscal consolidations points to the vulnerabilities that leaders will face. This article shows that how some Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations have survived the daunting politics of fiscal consolidation by timing actions for periods of economic recovery and political honeymoons following elections and by pursuing deficit reduction strategies that emphasize broad sweeping changes yielding high potential for dramatic economic gains over the longer term. Unlike many European nations today, the seemingly endless appetite for US treasuries by worldwide markets give the United States the luxury of choosing to begin deficit reduction only when the economy strengthens. However, the absence of market pressure also reduces the sense of urgency, consigning national leaders to create internal crises such as the 2012 “fiscal cliff” to force their own hand. While the polarized politics characterizing our party system does not bode well for concerted fiscal action, divided government carries the potential for spreading political risks and promoting more sustainable fiscal outcomes, as it has in our recent history and in other nations as well.     

Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections

While Euroscepticism is the most important driver of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) support, other attitudinal drivers – namely dissatisfaction towards mainstream parties and xenophobia – are also important. Examining vote‐switching between first‐ and second‐order elections evidence is found of a distinction between two types of supporter: more affluent and middle‐class ‘strategic defectors’ from the mainstream Conservative Party who support UKIP to register their Euroscepticism, and more economically marginal and politically disaffected ‘core loyalists’ who are attracted to UKIP by its anti‐immigration rhetoric and populist anti‐establishment strategy. UKIP also succeeds in attracting core support from groups such as women who have traditionally rejected extreme right parties such as the British National Party (BNP). This suggests that UKIP is well positioned to recruit a broader and more enduring base of support than the BNP.     

AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF TITTLE'S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY*

Classic statements of control theory propose that individuals who are controlled or bonded will be more likely to be deterred from deviance, while those who are not controlled or bonded will be more likely to turn to deviance. In a recent restatement of control theory, Tittle (1995) offers an alternative viewpoint. Though he agrees that a lack of control (a control deficit) can lead to repressive forms of deviance (predation, defiance, and submission), Tittle also asserts that overcontrol (a control surplus) may lead to autonomous types of deviance (exploitation, plunder, and decadence). Terming it control balance theory, Tittle argues that the amount of control to which one is subject relative to the amount of control one can exercise (i.e., the control ratio) affects not only the probability that one will engage in a deviant act, but also the specific form or type of deviance. In this article, we focus on one of the key hypotheses of control balance theory: an individual's control balance ratio predicts deviant behavior. We examine this hypothesis using two vignettes designed to investigate the repressive acts of predation and defiance. Segmented, nonlinear regression results yield mixed evidence in that both control surpluses and control deficits significantly predict predation and defiance. The theoretical implications of our results for control balance theory are discussed.     

TOWARD A NATIONAL ESTIMATE OF POLICE USE OF NONLETHAL FORCE*

Research Summary Despite frequent calls for national data on police use of force, the literature is dominated by unrepresentative samples from a small number of primarily urban jurisdictions, inconsistent definitions of force, and differing universes for the computation of rates. Among 36 publications that report on the amount of nonlethal force used by the police, rates vary from 0.1% to 31.8%. To improve our ability to estimate the amount of nonlethal force in the United States, we employ data from two sources: the Police‐Public Contact Survey (PPCS) and the Survey of Inmates in Local Jails (SILJ). Using comparable measures from these surveys, we estimate that the police use or threaten to use force in 1.7% of all contacts and in 20.0% of all arrests. The PPCS accounts for 87% of the total force incidents derived from both surveys. Males, youths, and racial minorities report greater rates of police use of force, but multivariate models highlight the role of potentially provoking behaviors on the likelihood and severity of force. Policy Implications Improved estimates from the combined PPCS‐SILJ samples support the proposition that police use force infrequently and at the lower end of the severity scale. Reported amounts of force vary based on respondent race, sex, and age, but greater variation in police use of force is explained by suspect behavior. The combined PPCS‐SILJ sample provides a more representative basis for estimating the rate and correlates of nonlethal force. State and local estimates from less representative samples can be interpreted in light of these findings. National estimates could be improved by devoting sufficient resources to support the collection of agency records of both lethal and nonlethal force.     

Legal Truths and Falsities*

This paper has a two‐pronged thesis. First, laws should be understood as making factual claims about the moral order. Second, the truth or falsity of these claims depends as much on the content of the law as on whether the lawmaker has political authority. In particular, laws produced by legitimate authorities are successful as laws when they guide subjects' behavior by giving subjects authoritative reasons for action. This paper argues that laws produced by legitimate authorities accomplish this task (i) by being on their own sufficient to change the moral state of affairs, which (ii) thereby generates for people new moral reasons to act that they can read right off of the legislation.